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POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

No. 1849

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'NORMALIZATION' IN POLAND SAID TO BE WORRISOME TO SOVIETS

Paris LE MONDE in French 23 Sep 80 p 3

[Article by correspondent Daniel Vernet: "The Slow Pace of Normalization Irritates and Makes the Soviets Impatient"]

[Text] Moscow--The Soviet leaders have not abandoned their position of wait-and-see which they adopted right from the beginning of the Polish crisis, but they are evidencing growing impatience and irritation before the delays in "normalization." This is the interpretation most currently suggested in the latest articles in the press. First, in an article emanating from the central committee [of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] under the signature of "Petrov," PRAVDA of 20 September 1980 stressed foreign interference (see LE MONDE of 21-22 September 1980). Second, it has published the "optimistic" reports on the "good" Polish communists--those who are receptive to the masses--and the "good" workers--those who do not take part in strikes. Moscow's line of conduct thus seems to be the following: The crisis is an internal matter of Poland and must be solved by the Poles themselves.

Until when will the Kremlin wait for evidence that the leaders of the PZPR [(Polish) United Workers' Party] are in a position to control the situation? It is quite clear that Moscow would change attitude if it were convinced that the Poles are incapable of getting out of the crisis by themselves. The renewal of warnings in the style of the latest editorial in PRAVDA indicates that the doubts of the Soviet leaders are getting stronger. The latter had obviously not been dissatisfied with the conclusion of the Gdansk agreements as such even if the letter of these accords did not suit them. In their eyes, what should be done now is to rid them of their substance during the implementation stage. That is the principal role which has devolved on Stanislaw Kania.

For Moscow, the solution of the crisis moves through the ending of the strikes, the limitation of the rights of the independent trade unions, and the resumption of control by the [communist] party. All the documents published on the occasion of the crisis, from the congratulatory message of Leonid Brezhnev to Stanislaw Kania to the editorials of PRAVDA, constitute veritable government programs focused around some simple ideas: To enhance the party's leadership role, to fight the antisocialist elements, and to probe deeper into the principles of Leninism and proletarian internationalism.

The relative confidence in rapid normalization manifested by Moscow at first was to a large extent based on its analysis of the Polish economy. It was felt here

that there was no material basis for a renewed flaring of the crisis, the pressure of economic difficulties being slated to deter workers from launching new strikes and to persuade them contrariwise to work harder to make up for the time lost. In the past few weeks the Soviets have not failed to remind the Poles of their errors in administration and to reproach them for their dependence on the West. The Soviets could take advantage of the situation by subordinating their economic aid to a closer integration of Poland within CEMA and even to the Poles' making political concessions. All observers are in agreement in thinking that the negotiations undertaken at the beginning of September 1980 by Mieczyslaw Jagielski in Moscow were difficult.

The basic problem concerns the existence of several competing trade union organizations in a socialist country. Is trade union pluralism, even if embryonic, compatible with the Soviet model of socialism? Undoubtedly, the Soviets have been constrained to accept in Poland many shocks to their dogmas: The power of the [Catholic] Church, agrarian structures with the existence of a private peasant sector, dependence of the Polish economy on the capitalist world. Does the existence of independent trade unions side by side with the official organization represent merely one specific Polish arrangement among others or the drop of water which burst the dike?

In fact, the peaceful revolt of the Polish workers is in itself a harsh blow for the USSR, for the model of society whose champion the Soviet Union is everywhere in the world. If workers belonging furthermore to the laboring aristocracy are going on strike to demand the abolition of privileges and the recognition of fundamental rights which workers in the bourgeois democracies have enjoyed for nearly a century now, the situation is fermenting. It is difficult to lay all responsibility upon imperialist and revanchist circles. Incidentally, Soviet propaganda has evidenced a certain amount of disarray in this matter.

Risk of Contagion...Even in the USSR?

The evolution of the situation in Poland is unacceptable for the Soviet leadership. This is true for three reasons: The nature of the socialist regime, the risks of contagion, and the Soviet strategy in Europe. While Moscow took good care not to blame the actions of the Polish leadership, the job was done by others. The Czechoslovak newspaper RUDE PRAVO has just put the dots on the "i"'s by noting that "the right to strike in a socialist country is contrary to the interests of the workers." It would undoubtedly be possible thanks to a few psychological gimmicks to justify trade union pluralism, but the dynamics created by the competition of several organizations, not only among the workers but also among the intellectuals, coupled with a relaxation even though relative of censorship, can undermine the bases of the socialist system.

As for the risk of contagion, it concerns in the first place the people's democracies of central Europe. Their leaders could be the strongest partisans of the restoration of order in Poland, as Wladyslaw Gomulka was in 1968 for Czechoslovakia. But the Soviet Union itself has not been spared although the movement for human rights cannot be compared to the Polish opposition movement. In a few years the Soviet authorities have practically succeeded in the "purge" of their dissidents who, one after another, from the most famous to the most obscure, have been neutralized. Additionally, a chasm has always existed in the USSR as it had earlier

in [Czarist] Russia between the workers and the intellectuals. The dissident movement was founded by the latter who witnessed, not without a distrust colored with scorn, the attempts to establish free trade unions like the SMOT [expansion unknown; possibly, Metropolitan Transport Workers' Union].

But the events in Poland have restored significance to the terms strike and union for the entire Soviet working class which could not help raising questions. At party meetings, in the major enterprises, at conferences of a political nature, people have questioned speakers and have asked, notably, why the Soviet press has not published the text of the Gdansk accords.

The sudden increase in the number of articles on Soviet trade unions, on their role in the service of the workers' well-being reflects a certain degree of apprehension. For the questions and demands of the Polish workers are valid elsewhere and notably in the Soviet Union. The shortage of food products and meat, the rises in wages financed by printing money, the privileges of party members, the bureaucratic administration of the trade unions whose principal function consists in making people work are not exclusively Polish in nature.

It appears that the Soviet leaders will draw conclusions from these facts in the next few months but it is still difficult to say whether they will decide to accelerate reforms (economic, for example) or whether they will look once more for subterfuges.

The third reason for Moscow's concern flows from the strategic position of Poland in the Soviet military camp and its abruptly disclosed fragility. For, despite the Poles' assertions of loyalty to Poland's alliance with the Soviet Union, very understandable under the present circumstances, the Soviets understand perfectly well that the existence of a socialist regime on the other side of the Bug [River] rests on a contingent consensus among the Polish party, the [Catholic] Church, and a working class which does not resign itself. The Soviets took good note that, in the past few weeks, the Polish leaders, whoever they may be, have never justified socialism on the basis of the well-being it has brought the people but only on the basis of Poland's geopolitical situation. This is flattering for the USSR [sic] but is not very reassuring.

If the recovery operation with which the new Polish leadership has been entrusted should fail, what will the Soviets do? After giving the impression that they were holding back will the Soviets choose direct, brutal intervention including that through military means? To raise the question is not a "sacrilege," postwar history evidencing that the USSR does not recoil before intervention when it deems its fundamental interests or those of the socialist community (that it often identifies with its own) to be in jeopardy.

Harsh Trials for an Aging Leadership

It is in the Kremlin's complete interest to avoid a trial of strength. The latter would be to deal the death blow to a detente which is already quite sick, to definitively jeopardize the Madrid conference [on European cooperation and security], and to encourage the most hard-line elements in the Federal Republid of Germany and the United States. It would also be to sow new troubles in the communist

movement over which Moscow has succeeded, with a few exceptions, in restoring control in the past few months. The authorities do not forget either that intervention in Czechoslovakia marked the point of departure of the human rights movement in the USSR and that such grave decisions exacerbate power struggles within the leadership where, contrary to widely held opinion, the "hard-liners" are not always the fiercest partisans of military force.

Even though involved in Afghanistan in an adventure whose end they do not see, the Soviet authorities would not for all that hesitate for long if they felt their position in Poland to be threatened. The maintenance of the territorial and political "status quo" in Europe would have priority over any other consideration. As the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union approaches--an occasion which, like all other events of this kind, should represent a moment of triumph, the picture is rather somber. These are harsh trials for an aging leadership.

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CSO: 3100

COMMENT ON KANIA-PINKOWSKI MEETING WITH BREZHNEV NOTED

Paris LE MONDE in French 1 Nov 80 pp 1, 3

[Article by special correspondent Bernard Guetta: "A Turning Point in Poland?"]

[Text] After the return from Moscow of Stanislaw Kania and Jozef Pinkowski, heads of the [Polish communist] party and the Polish government, respectively, people were wondering in Warsaw what consequences their meeting with Leonid Brezhnev would have on the talks begun on Friday 31 October 1980, late in the morning between the Polish prime minister and the representatives of the independent trade union, Solidarity.

According to the communique published in Moscow, Brezhnev trusts the Polish communists and workers to settle their problems. The communique took account of the efforts made in Warsaw "for the purpose of stabilization." It also condemned "the attempts by some imperialist circles to engage in subversive activities against socialist Poland."

Warsaw--Film of the trip to Moscow shown on Thursday evening, 30 October 1980, on television was rather reassuring: The Polish prime minister, Jozef Pinkowski, kept smiling, which happens rarely with him, incidentally. Stanislaw Kania appeared to be very much at ease and there was no end of embraces at the airport. One could hardly notice that the two Warsaw leaders seemed quite alone on one side of the discussion table facing the long line of Soviet leaders who, on the other side, surrounded Leonid Brezhnev.

The brief communique read by the newscaster was, too, of a nature to calm spirits. It certainly noted the firm resolve "to safeguard and strengthen indestructible fraternal ties" and sharply condemned "attempts at interference in internal Polish affairs" and "the antisocial activities of some imperialist circles." One was very far from the disquieting tone of the recent statements made in East Berlin, Prague, and Bucharest since there was no reference either to activity by antisocialist forces in Poland or to condemnation of the independent trade unions (which were not even mentioned), or to any concern whatever in the face of the Polish events.

Contrariwise, the communique expressed the "conviction...that the Polish workers will know how to solve the acute problems" facing their country. In other words,

officially at least, the crisis experienced by their ally continued to be an internal matter to the Soviets and this is first and foremost what the leaders of Solidarity noted.

Their relief before the television screens was obvious. But this relief continues to be very subdued, too, for it is recognized that the Soviet leadership could not publicly afford--without this having much more important repercussions--the same meddling as Erich Honecker especially indulged in.

At any rate, the impromptu trip of Stanislaw Kania and Jozef Pinkowski is a warning, the clearest that has emanated from Moscow so far, and the true test of the attitude adopted by the USSR will be the result of this Friday's discussions between the authorities and Solidarity.

Meeting at the Club of Catholic Intellectuals [KIK] of Warsaw, the leaders of the movement got ready all afternoon on Thursday and early in the morning for these negotiations which were slated to get under way at 1100 hours this Friday morning. Six of them (including four of the Gdansk team) were designated as direct interlocutors of Jozef Pinkowski, but the prime minister will face no fewer than 64 persons: 41 members of the national committee, 9 of the Gdansk presidium, and 14 "experts."

Not To Accept Responsibility for a Break

The trade unionists, who recalled before going to the prime minister's office their decision to "get ready for a strike" on 12 November 1980 in case of failure, say that they are determined not to accept responsibility for a break. It is not excluded then that the talks could extend over the weekend or next week. The most difficult point will be that of Solidarity's registration since the workers' leaders wish to secure the quashing of the amendments to their bylaws made last Friday by the Warsaw court. Legal solutions--especially with the great flexibility which they have already been able to evidence--are not lacking and the problem is obviously of a political nature first and foremost. For the time being, the very infrequent feedbacks that one can hear do not promot optimism about the answers which the prime minister may provide on this score.

On Thursday afternoon Lech Walesa, who has increasingly appeared as a moderate in the movement whose symbol he is, made contact with the Catholic hierarchy which seems to exercise a more and more marked influence on him. Nothing has come through of what was said on that occasion. But it is certain that the [Catholic] Church--and particularly the secretary of the episcopal conference, Monsignor Stanislaw Dabrowski, who in the absence of the primate on a trip to Rome plays a primary role--argues in favor of conciliation.

Another element of lesser but notable importance is the rapprochement between the group of experts chaired by Tadeusz Mazowiecki and the leader of the KOR [Workers' Self-Defense Committee], Jacek Kuron. The latter, whose influence has been deemed heretofore to be dangerous by Mr Mazowiecki and his friends, threw all his weight on Tuesday (see LE MONDE of 30 October 1980) in favor of approving Warsaw instead of Gdansk as the site of negotiations. This rapprochement itself militates for moderation since it is of a nature to temper the

radicalism of the presidium of the Gdansk trade union. But the determinant element in the negotiations continues to be the recommendations which the Soviet leaders can have made to the Polish officials.

An encouraging indication on this score perhaps is the fact that no one has sought to exploit the explosion which occurred on Thursday without causing significant damage at the Warsaw offices of Aeroflot [Soviet airline]. What is reportedly involved, it is asserted both in official Polish circles and Soviet circles in Warsaw, is an "accident." The explanation, incidentally, is entirely plausible--at least as much so, at any rate, as the hypothesis of an attack, a thought that had occurred to everyone right away.

2662
CSO: 3100

DEEPENING OF POLISH CRISIS NOTED

Paris LE MONDE in French 9 Dec 80 p 3

[Article: "The Evolution of the Polish Crisis"]

[Text] The warnings against the consequences of possible Soviet military intervention in Poland continue to increase. The latest are those of Beijing and several officials of the PCI [Italian Communist Party].

In Warsaw, the politburo of the PZPR [(Polish) United Workers' Party] denounced in a communique on Saturday 6 December 1980, the "counterrevolutionary" threat which weighs on the "socialist renewal" in Poland and deemed that this threat originates with "adversaries of socialism who sow anarchy and disorder in the country's social and economic life."

The party's politburo also asserted that it "appreciates greatly the conviction expressed by sister parties that the Polish communists, the Polish working class, and the Polish workers are in a position to overcome the difficulties that have appeared," as well as "the understanding, solidarity, and support evidenced by the other countries of the socialist community vis-a-vis Poland and their economic assistance and their disposition to continue to lend a helping hand also in the future."

The Polish daily ZYCIE WARSZAWAY on its part summed up the situation as follows: "No one can say yet whether the year 1980 will figure in history as that of the victory of a socialist model of freedom and reason in Poland or as the year of a new collapse." The latest story told in Warsaw reaches to the heart of the problem: "Brezhnev wished to join Solidarity. Unfortunately Walesa had to disapprove Brezhnev's membership because the topmost Soviet leader did not want to recognize the leadership role of the PZPR."

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IMPORTANCE OF WARSAW TO MOSCOW'S DEFENSE EXAMINED

Paris LE MONDE in French 9 Dec 80 p 3

[Article by correspondent D.V.: "For the Soviet Leaders Moscow's Defense Begins in Warsaw"]

[Text] Moscow--No information, not even a clue, has been given on the content of the discussions which may have taken place at the summit meeting of the Warsaw Pact on Friday 5 December 1980, in Moscow. Some sources, which are not completely "unbiased," report however the moderating role of the Romanians. Even though Romania had not attended any of the meetings in 1968 connected with the Prague spring, its participation in the Moscow summit constituted a diplomatic success for the Soviets, who were able to restore the unity of the socialist camp in the face of the Polish crisis. However, Nicolae Ceausescu reportedly decided to go to Moscow only after receiving Leonid Brezhnev's message transmitted by Stefan Andrei, Romanian minister of foreign affairs, in which the Soviet head of state and of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU] allegedly gave a certain number of appeasing reassurances if not guarantees regarding his intentions.

One will also note, besides the moderation of some of the terms of the communique ("international solidarity" instead of "proletarian or socialist internationalism," for example), that the makeup of the delegations reflected fairly faithfully the degree of concern of the sister countries with the evolution of the situation in Poland. If one may put it this way, the Soviets had a full complement: Next to Leonid Brezhnev sat Mikhail Suslov, the guardian of the ideological orthodoxy; Nikolay Tikhonov, head of the government; Army Gen Yuriy Andropov, head of the KGB [(Soviet) Committee for State Security] and former organizer of the Soviet intervention in Budapest in 1956 in his capacity as ambassador to Hungary; Andrey Gromyko, minister of foreign affairs; Mar. Dimitriy Ustinov, minister of defense; and Konstantin Rusakov, secretary of the [CPSU] central committee in charge of relations with sister parties in office.

The makeup was the same among the East Germans. Besides the heads of the communist party and of the German Democratic Republic government, the heads of the army, police, and foreign affairs were present. Among the Czechs the minister of defense was absent. However, the "lightest" delegation was that from Budapest, reflecting the lukewarm attitude of the Hungarian leaders in this entire affair.

The fact remains that Stanislaw Kania and the Polish leadership have been placed under "surveillance." The mandate given to them is clear: To restore order and

keep Poland in the united family of the socialist countries. The Poles have solemnly reiterated this commitment.

The Moscow summit met a twofold need asserted in its communique: To define a common position in the socialist camp and to express the confidence of the Eastern European states in the pursuit of detente despite or because of Poland. The communique of the Warsaw Pact did not go to the extent of explicitly affirming that the events in Poland challenge the common interests of the socialist camp but, paradoxically, the declaration of the politburo of the PZPR [(Polish) United Workers' Party] approving the position of the Polish delegation in Moscow took care of this problem. It indicated in fact that "the situation in Poland has great importance for the power and security of the countries of the socialist community as well as for the process of detente and peace in Europe." This statement undoubtedly did no more than reflect the substance of the speeches made during the Kremlin meeting.

The Soviet press had, incidentally, dealt with this theme at length on the eve of the meeting. The LITERATOURNAY GAZETA had reprinted an article from the Czechoslovak newspaper RUDE PRAVO striking an analogy between the events in Poland and the Prague spring: "Wherever imperialism succeeds in creating a wedge in the economic integration of the socialist countries (the allusion was to Poland's indebtedness to the West--[editor's note]), it deals a blow to the interests of all the socialist countries without exception," RUDE PRAVO wrote, and this was cited by the organ of the Writers' Union. While in the organ of the Soviet army, "Red Star," a Polish colonel was lauding their brotherhood in arms and asserting that "Poland has been and will continue to be a faithful ally of the leading socialist power," "Soviet Russia" was explaining that for the imperialists the road to Moscow runs through Warsaw.

Always in the forefront of the news, the publication went and ferreted out the confessions of two German deserters in 1960 to explain the subversive strategy of NATO in Eastern Europe. Recalling the "events" of Berlin, Budapest, and Prague, it noted that imperialism seeks "before everything else to isolate the members of the Warsaw Pact from one another." It is clear, the paper added, that since the creation of NATO nothing has changed. The alliance is still preparing aggression against the socialist states. "The roads of Berlin and Prague, according to the plans of the aggressors, should lead their troops up to Warsaw.... The campaign waged lately in the West, especially by the German revanchists, against the Polish socialist state throws a fairly clear light on the secret calculations of NATO's general staff.... Its true objective in case of war is Moscow," "Soviet Russia" wrote, adding: "First, an attack against Czechoslovakia, then against Poland, and after that against the Soviet Union."

The conclusion is thus self-evident: When the members of the Warsaw Pact asserted that "Poland has been, is, and will continue to be socialist" (communique of 5 December 1980), it is not only the interests of the Polish people that they had in mind.

2662
CSO: 3100

CPCZ CONTROL CHAIRMAN ON ACHIEVEMENTS OF DECADE

Prague NOVA MYSL in Czech No 12 7 Nov 80 pp 87-98

[Article by Miroslav Capka, chairman of the Central Control and Audit Commission of the CPCZ: "Pressing Issues in the Evolution of the Control Activities of the Party"]

[Text] At the present time one and a half million communists are gathering at annual membership meetings of the basic Party organizations in order to evaluate recent activities and to set guidelines for activities in 1981. They are thus initiating a period of intensive preparations for the 16th CPCZ Congress, which will begin on 6 April of the coming year, in accordance with a resolution of the 18th session of the Central Committee. The concrete, critical, and self-critical discussions of these communists, which have further been characterized by a commitment to the success of common endeavors, is related to the mobilization of all the efforts and abilities of Party members and candidates so indispensible to the implementation of the program objectives of our policies.

The deliberations of agencies and organizations at all levels of the Party structure is justifiably the center of attention for the non-Party public as well, because they serve as an inexhaustible source of ideological instruction, inspiration, and motivation for additional active work for socialism. The Party has never considered the discussions of communists to be a strictly internal activity, divorced from the lives and work of people. The intense interest on the part of workers, cooperative members, and the intelligentsia is a manifestation of the recognition of the leading position of the Party in society and a confirmation of the fact that the preparation for the 16th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia is a task for all of society. The best evidence of this is the numerous work commitments of individuals and entire work collectives, by means of which the citizens of socialist Czechoslovakia want to greet the congress of the leading force in their country.

The overall positive results achieved at the 14th and 15th Congresses indicate that the political line of the Party Central Committee, headed by comrade Gustav Husak, is correct, verified in practice, and that it is not necessary to alter its concept.

The 18th session of the Party Central Committee provided ample evidence that progressive trends unambiguously predominated in all facets of our life during the overall development of the past decade. We are successfully implementing the critical program objectives of the 15th Congress, in spite of deteriorating

external economic conditions which are making difficult the achievement of certain socio-economic goals. For example, during the Sixth Five-Year Plan national income will increase 21 to 22 percent, making it more than one fifth higher than at the beginning of the 5 year plan. The volume of industrial production will increase by one quarter, and the volume of construction by 28 percent. The machine building and chemical industries are experiencing dynamic growth. We are proud of the fact that in spite of increasing discrimination against socialist countries on the part of western imperialist circles headed by the USA, the standard of living here continues to rise. Money incomes will grow in the course of the 5 year plan by Kcs 66.6 billion or almost 23 percent. It is expected that the average monthly wage will reach Kcs 2645 by the end of the Sixth Five-Year Plan, representing a full 15 percent increase. Average yearly meat consumption is way above the world average, amounting to 84 kilograms per capita. Almost every other family now owns a passenger car. Almost every household is fully equipped with consumer durables such as washing machines, radios, televisions, vacuum cleaners, and refrigerators. Citizens will receive more than 650,000 modern apartments in the course of the Sixth Five-Year Plan. At the same time we have built new facilities for the chemical industry at Litvinov, our first VVER type atomic power plant at Jaslovske Bohunice, etc. Construction work in the capital of the CSSR, Prague, requires by itself expenditures of Kcs 43 billion, while the North Bohemian region claims Kcs 38 billion, and the capital city of the Slovak Socialist Republic, Bratislava, Kcs 17 billion...

During the annual member meetings and all-factory, enterprise, city, district, and regional CPCZ conferences communists are verifying the fulfillment of Party resolutions. They are comparing results with original intentions. They are measuring and weighing assets in terms of performance. They are considering the efficiency of their ideological influence. They will search energetically, and with a thorough knowledge of the situation, for the roots of weaknesses and the causes of the shortcomings slowing our forward movement. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia rightly points out that the attempt to avoid the difficulties which life places in our path only plays into the hands of those individuals who plan to exploit skillfully our errors and shortcomings, even though they are not capable themselves of proposing a better solution. Subjective errors and shortcomings only slow our development, and are even at times a source of vacillation and skepticism. Certain individuals easily lose perspective under their influence. They lose the ability to perceive a situation realistically and in all its ramifications, the ability not to submit to various pressures and conjunctural moods, to weigh possibilities and viewpoints, and to draw conclusions and work towards an active resolution of problems and difficulties solely on the solid ground of knowledge and a class approach.

For instance, our experiences with inspections of the ways in which basic Party organizations are enforcing statutes governing the assurance of the economic policy of the Party have indicated efforts by several economic managerial employees to shift the burden of difficulties to others, to free themselves of responsibility for their own shortcomings by pointing to shortcomings of the supplier, to emphasize objective, mainly foreign influences on the insufficient economic performance of their factory. Certainly no one denies, nor wants to deny, that this is in fact the reality in many instances. However, it would be a political error and shortsightedness for us to fail to see that at any given level of management the most basic problems are precisely of internal origin. Development under socialism is not without conflict, it occurs on the basis of surmounting the antagonisms

which arise in the life of a society. When comrade Gustav Husak spoke about these issues at the 18th session of the Party Central Committee, he emphasized that "We are aware that the struggle to master new, fundamentally more demanding objective conditions of economic development requires constant effort, a creative attitude, and the implementation of basic, comprehensive measures. We must place still greater emphasis on ever better, more efficient utilization of the internal resources and potential of our economy, on the more consistent realization of the strategic line of the Party for the greater efficiency and quality of all work. This is the sole realistic alternative as an attitude for the upcoming period as well. Despite the clear results which have already been achieved through its implementation, the pace with which we are moving ahead corresponds neither to our needs nor to our potential. Therefore we must perceive much more sharply the subjective side of our difficulties and shortcomings as well." (RUDE PRAVO, 8 October 1980, p. 2).

These words of the general secretary of the Central Committee of our Party directly challenge Party agencies and organizations, all communists, but also other citizens to look much more critically than hertofore at the difficulties and weaknesses which are accompanying our development at present. They challenge them to react actively to the causes of negative phenomena and generate much more effort to overcome them, among other ways by utilizing the Set of Measures for Improving the Planned Management System. Our production is as a rule more expensive than that of our world competition. The specifications of a significant number of our goods do not correspond to the requirements of a demanding customer. We consume significantly more raw materials, material, and energy per unit of output. For instance, the fact that we failed to achieve, during the past 4 years, the planned reduction in production consumption means that we lowered the national income by Kcs 36 billion. It is absolutely essential to keep in mind that the cause of the reduced growth in national income, the level of which determines the development of the standard of living, lies to the greatest extent in the low level of valuation of labor and material inputs into the production process. For instance, an inspection agency has determined that we lose more than 400,000 tons of crude oil and crude oil products per year solely because labor procedures and technical discipline are not maintained and because we are neglecting the timely modernization and maintenance of obsolete refinery equipment. There are also frequent spills of oil onto the ground and into waste water. At the same time, losses are also due to insufficient regulational activity and inefficient control of operations on the part of professional groups and management employees of the general directorate of Prague Chemopetrol, Bratislava Slovchemia, as well as the Ministries of Industry of the Czech and Slovak Socialist Republics.

In other instances we have discovered that in the general directorates of certain economic production units there is a lack of a clear, prepared, and responsible reaction by communists to difficult problems with which the work collectives in individual factories are struggling. At times we lack a more active attitude to the resolution of problems, and a critical view of the style, methods, and efficiency of management work. Managerial employees are not devoting sufficient attention to the efficiency of the production process. They implement only inconsistently the resolutions of Party agencies concer[illegible]tructural changes and the more flexible utilization of scientific and te[illegible]l findings. It is therefore essential that Party organizations at ministr[illegible] and on general directorates assist more effectively in the control of the performance of the

activities of these offices and their employees, in accordance with Party statutes and CPCZ Central Committee Directives for the Further Improvement of the Activity of Party Organizations in Central, State, and Social Agencies and Institutions.

Control of the fulfillment of congress resolutions which is now conducted, following the example of the Party Central Committee, by Party organizations in factories, agricultural cooperatives, offices, and institutions, unites the whole Party not only for today, but especially for the fulfillment of tomorrow's tasks. This is why it is so important that communists be an example of a communistic attitude to work, that they stand in the forefront of those who implement and defend all that is new and progressive, that they strive to introduce the best experiences and findings into production and social practice.

We must always transfer the battle for the utilization of great and small potential and for the solution of as yet unsolved problems to the level of concrete, committed, and creative labor. Communists must, therefore, intensify their politico-organizational work, pursue the fulfillment of the major, decisive objectives, and at the same time constantly develop worker initiative. The words of comrade Husak at the November 1974 session of the CPCZ Central Committee have lost none of their relevance in this regard: "Although we do not wish to simplify the complexity of the problem, we consider the quality of the management of the concrete decision making, organizational, and controlling activities of managerial employees from the top down to be the decisive element. The successful utilization of our potential and the mastering of new tasks depends, above all, on their responsibility and Party-oriented approach, on their resolve to battle against inertia, complacency with a routine, and to implement rigorously the Party line, to set high standards for the results of one's own work and that of others, and not to avoid conflicts on matters concerning the interests of the Party and people. When we analyse shortcomings and differentiate between objective factors and those dependent on individuals, it is evident that specific people are responsible for the vast majority of concrete shortcomings. We must draw the necessary conclusions from this." (CPCZ Central Committee Session, 27 to 29 November 1974. Prague: CPCZ Central Committee 1975, p. 27)

The upcoming period will be a rigorous verification of the abilities, political maturity, moral qualities and professional training of managerial employees. It will be a test of their ability to implement the line of the 16th Congress, which will increase demands to a level corresponding to the existing world conditions and our standing in the world. We need people leading work collectives who see a fellow creator of Party policy in every worker. We need words from them which are not at variance with their deeds and for them to fulfill those tasks to which they commit themselves for a comprehensive evaluation. At the present time, as comrade Miroslav Cmarko, hero of socialist labor from Handluv Dul, has said, a foreman cannot be a driver, but an organizer. He must awaken in people the energy and resolve to fulfill the objectives of the state plan and not to fear obstacles. We have such comrades managing workshops, operations, and enterprises, and they are in a majority. In Rakon Rakovnik, 2 comprehensive rationalization brigades are working under communist leadership which have, in cooperation with the College of Chemical Technology, directed their attention at the rapid practical introduction of research results. Thanks to their efforts it has been possible this year to reduce raw material imports from capitalist countries by more than 10 million foreign currency korunas.

It is clear that in a politically and professionally well managed work collective the members become progressively more aware that labor discipline and the conscientious fulfillment of entrusted responsibilities have a deep legal, but also political and economic content. It is primarily by conscientious, committed labor that the individual expresses his tie to society, to the factory, to his fellow workers. Such collectives have already comprehended that the enthusiasm with which they entered the battle for a rapid increase in production volume after the 14th Party Congress has received a new aspect in the requirement for an unconditional, constant, and under no circumstances only average increase in the quality and efficiency of all labor. Awareness must now be more boldly expressed in liters, units, tons of quality products finding applications in the most demanding markets. Communists above all must, therefore, reach into the reserves of all their strengths and abilities, many times as yet untouched. In cooperation with members of professional and union organizations they must create an atmosphere at workplaces which leaves no room for slovenly, parasitic, absentee workers, or for workers who frequently change jobs, or for those people who, without blushing, put out their hand and ask "how much do I get for that", without being at the same time able and willing to fulfill established targets and put out quality work for the unit. Therefore an essential instrument is the simultaneous development and maintenance of performance and consumption standards.

The experiences of our Soviet comrades show that given the overall improvement of the planning and management of economic development, we will achieve the necessary results only when we will at the same time also improve the economic mind-set and psychological approach to management. Therefore, we will quite logically require from managerial employees not only extensive professional knowledge and political consciousness, but also perceptiveness, adherence to Party principles, and the ability independently to decide regarding complex problems, and to display at the same time firmness, even courage in defending the interests of the state and the people. We will demand that managers be able strongly to oppose a narrow sectoral, local interest group approach while at the same time consistently battling against conservatism and routine. The managerial employee must learn to perceive the political and moral side of his attitude towards decision-making and in discussions with his colleagues.

An analysis conducted by control and audit commissions at all levels of the Party structure, and which drew on thousands of experienced Party functionaries, has indicated that there are still individuals--and unfortunately there is not a small number of them--who, as soon as they confront a complicated economic situation, give in to difficulties, negotiate frequently even against their conscience, and who are not capable of approaching the fulfillment of their entrusted responsibilities from a Party-oriented view. Such comrades must be assisted by comradely criticism, and in the event that this does not help an appropriate personnel solution must be adopted. We must in all instances link the increasing demands on economic managerial workers with a systematic concern for their training and the consistent control of their activities. In every concrete instance the Party organization must be able to analyse the causes of shortcomings, while at the same time not permitting anyonymity and making accountable those responsible for the shortcomings. This is clearly proper, provided that Party agencies and organizations provide full political support to the economic management of factories, and if they assist with mass political work and their own controlling work. These measures, however, can in no way replace the director or other comrades who were entrusted with a responsibility

and the relevant jurisdiction. Party organizations have the task of defending the interests and needs of the entire society. They must, therefore, conduct themselves and make decisions in such a way that their authority contributes to the implementation of plan targets, which express these interests and needs of society. The standing of the Czechoslovak Communist Party as the leading force of the socialist society is imbedded in the constitution of the CSSR. The Party is the vanguard of the working class, a volunteer, militant alliance of the most active and conscious citizens from the ranks of workers, cooperative farmers, and the intelligentsia. In the interest of the working class and all other working people, it leads society in the realization of a scientifically based program of socialist construction. A component of this mission is the comprehensive execution of a controlling function. The Party constantly controls the approach to program objectives, the level of their implementation and, with the help of communists in state, economic, and social agencies and organizations, exerts a political and ideological influence, at times by using the instruments of power, so as not to permit, or to correct, undesirable deviations and in some instances provides suggestions for the reformulation of long term goals. If the tasks-- as comrade Gustav Husak emphasized at the 18th session of the Party Central Committee-- are ever more demanding and complex, then control over the integration of the plan into everyday life must also be at the necessary level.

The necessity for control as an indispensible function of Party leadership of society stems from the necessity for the constant overcoming of contradictions between theory and practice. Only on the basis of perceived deviations can we form a more precise view of reality, influence it and change it in accordance with our goals. It is clear that without firm control of work performance and the fulfillment of resolutions and committments that the knowledge of the Party would not be complete. Nevertheless, if we emphasize the controlling function of the Party, this does not mean that we want to unilaterally raise this above other activities of basic organizations. To underestimate them would be unfair, and to the detriment of our common concerns. Consistently performed control makes possible a critical view of the level of Party work and of the work results of collectives and individuals. It makes possible the generalization of positive experiences and the avoidance of errors and difficulties. It is a preventive shield from the unhealthy emotion of self satisfaction. Control is the means for eliminating the conflict between promises, committments, and the extent of their fulfillment. Control is one of the most efficient resources in the battle against bureaucratism and a blind faith in the automatic fulfillment of approved resolutions. The control function of the Party, in close connection with its ideological, educational, and organizational roles, verifies the degree of effectiveness of the economic and political administration of the country, and of all links in the social mechanism.

Party control is characterized by its programmed nature and integrative content. It assures the defense of the revolutionary interests of the working class and guarantees a revolutionary perspective for the building of socialism in accordance with Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. Party control encompassing all areas of the life of society assures, as V.I. Lenin stated, a matching of word and deed which may be verified. As the leading political force of a socialist society, the Party systematically controls the realization of the approved political line not only within, but also outside of the Party. This is true

with regard to responsible managerial employees. The forms and methods of controlling activity are chosen by the agencies and organizations of the CPCZ so as to support the development of Leninist principles of Party related work within the entire Party, and so as to strengthen the leading position of the Party in society. The current annual member meetings, and the planned factory, enterprise, and city conferences all have a significant controlling component. Consistent control of the fulfillment of accepted tasks and approved resolutions brings positive results above all in instances where it makes use of the many organizational forms, where all components of the Party organism are examples of high quality, efficient work in their internal lives as well. In addition to the revolutionary defense of the victory of the working class, Party control activity also seeks, in this spirit, to provide a broad range of services to society. This is especially true in those areas where the most important consideration is the success or failure of party policy, such as the area of peaceful construction, the process of the development of our national economy.

Party organizations stand firmly at the forefront of the struggle to fulfill this year's targets and to create optimal conditions for the beginning of the Seventh Five Year Plan. Communists are taking the lead in defending and asserting the importance of the interests of society at large. They are intensifying their ideological and educational activity and developing their political organizational work in such a way as to assure the economic policy of the Party within the bounds of their political influence. Without the decisive role played by Party organizations, we would never be able to achieve the dynamic development of our national economy. Nevertheless, results often vary and at times do not even correspond to the effort expended. Some untapped potential also exists in Party related work, and by using it we can achieve better results than before fairly easily and rapidly.

Insufficient exercise of the control function by certain Party organizations serves to weaken their influence over an increase in the quality of management work by some managerial employees. How else is one to explain that at the Liptovsky Mikulas 1st of May Factories a condensing furnace imported for almost Kcs 2 million has not been used since 1977. Moreover this furnace will not be necessary at the factory in the future, and a short time ago no definite decision had been made regarding its further use. Some Party organizations also take little interest in the level of activity by communists on behalf of Party policy. Certain functionaries of CPCZ basic organizations have not sufficiently understood the Leninist concept of criticism and self criticism, and thanks to this a number of abuses have been transferred from economic activity to Party work. I have in mind, for instance, the liberal approach, defined as a compromising attitude to difficulties and the attempt to make excuses or to explain them in terms of objective problems which are the fault of no one. Or the reverse. Many times people have been racking their brains over a problem and turn to a Party organization for assistance. However, the economic managerial workers--and I have in mind certain directors and their deputies--somehow do not have the time to show up at the workplace. At many factories the proper content must be given to the little word "we". Collective decision making and task fulfillment belongs to the basic principles of socialist administration. Among these tenets is also the principle of the single leader. When there are problems with difficulties, or if we must assign responsibility for errors and shortcomings, then we must assign responsibility for errors and shortcomings, then we must always search for a specific person. We may not hide behind the whole, the mass, behind a lot of numbers and impersonal facts. Let us speak in the singular and let us speak precisely: "I", "you", "he".

Every chairman of a party organization, every functionary, knows how the useful and politically correctly conducted campaign of preparations for the exchange of membership credentials influenced the activity of communists and increased their responsibility for the success of Party policy. It was just in this period that we convinced ourselves what a powerful instrumen- concrete assignments are for the growth of the personal commitment and activity of communists. Concurrently with the period of preparations for the 16th CPCZ Congress is the time to monitor the fulfillment of the assignments taken on in the course of the exchange of credentials. We must evaluate what has been achieved and acknowledge positive results. Where tasks have been accomplished it is necessary to assign new projects in accordance with the needs of workplaces and consistent with the age, abilities, and experience of comrades.

By the same token, we have significant unused potential for the development of mass political work, in the organization of discussions, public meetings, collectives, Party related economic conferences. Poor preparation for such events in many cases influences worker participation. The great number of justified worker complaints directed at the Central Committee, district and regional committees, and CPCZ control and audit commissions at the same time calls attention to serious shortcomings in the management of the initiative of people. Communists cannot permit socialist committments to be consumed solely to pay off debts, which are often unnecessary, because of errors in the management and organization of work.

It is clear that the control function, performed by Party agencies at all levels of their structure, belong among the most important functions of the Party as the crucial managerial entity of a socialist society.

"Check the people and monitor what they have really accomplished--this, once again, this, and only this is now the core of all work, all policy", wrote V.I. Lenin. (V.I. Lenin, Works, vol. 33, p. 224)

This thought of Lenin is applicable today as well. The tasks have been formulated. We know what we want. The Party administration must, therefore, focus on the effectiveness of its ideological and organizational work and on monitoring the results which we achieve in this area. This is the purpose, content, and goal of the controlling activity of the Party. This means that the person who is honest, conscientious, and committed to the party and to socialism need not have misgivings regarding the control influence of the Party. We are even capable of standing up for such comrades. We comprehend control realized by Party agencies and organizations as strengthening the bond between Party and people, as eliminating errors and shortcomings. We see it as having a preventive function, that is that it avoids difficulties in a qualified manner and in plenty of time, rather than curing them after the fact and in an expensive way, as by a "surgical" intervention in the form of firing a person. The person who comprehends the controlling function of the Party in another way has not grasped the ABCs of the political system.

If we call attention to an understanding of the complicated situations which sometimes arise in production and its organization as a consequence of objective difficulties, this by no means indicates that the Party is prepared to overlook gross shortcomings, that it is predisposed to tolerate gross transgressions of Party and state discipline. Should an individual cause economic and political damages by his neglect, then he must also be made accountable. Irresponsibility,

slovenliness, passivity, no less that theft and the deliberate damaging of socialist property will not be tolerated by the Party, state, or society. We have enough power and resources to see to this. Criticism and self criticism are among the most effective political instruments employed by the Party in the elimination of perceived deviations in the education of cadres and the correction of shortcomings. Central, but also district and regional Party committees and basic organizations devote systematic attention to its development. Experience gained from a verification of the implementation of statutes governing the assurance of the economic policy of the Party convinced us that many things in this area have changed for the better, especially the conduct of committee and member meetings. On this, Party turf, there is a frequent exchange of views on the practical implementation of Party policy under the conditions of individual workplaces. Meetings, especially public meetings, of Party groups also provide a critical analysis of a situation. However, we are still encountering a number of phenomena which attest to the fact that deformations in the Leninist concept of criticism and self criticism, which were among the causes of the critical development in the Party and society, have not yet been completely overcome. Above all, the constructive function of criticism and self criticism has yet to be fully comprehended.

A critical relationship to work results, the critical analysis of successes, but also of shortcomings are essential stimulators of all activities of Party organizations. Only with their help are communists capable of discovering the causes of negative phenomena and deciding how to correct them. It is criticism and self criticism which enables Party organizations to differentiate between what is positive and what is not, what is retarding forward progress and what does not correspond to established goals and tasks. When L. I. Breznev spoke at the 25th Congress of Soviet communists about the importance of criticism and self criticism, he remarked that their base rests "on the objective evaluation of all aspects of the activity of this or that organization, of this or that worker, on the comprehensive analysis and subsequent elimination of current shortcomings, on a refusal to tolerate a liberal attitude towards shortcomings and those responsible for them. Trust in and respect for people must be joined with high standards for the fulfillment of untrusted tasks". (25th CPUSSR Congress. Prague, Svoboda, 1977, p. 63)

This corresponds to Makarenko--the more demands placed on a person, the more respect there is for him. This is logical. We cannot ask or expect much from a person who we do not respect. The Party respects people and also creates for them conditions which correspond to their participation in the process of building a mature socialist society. Criticism and self criticism are the means by which the Party resolves conflicts in the relation between the new and the old, between the progressive and the development of that which has been overcome, between that which is being born and that which is dying. They are an instrument for overcoming errors and mistakes, which may never be ruled out absolutely in the building of such a great edifice as socialism. Indifference and passivity in relation to the development of criticism and self criticism may, certainly, be evoked by lack of familiarity with the situation, or an inability to formulate a viewpoint before a large assembly. But more often it comes about because of poor relationships among individuals and, sometimes, between collectives. Nevertheless, it is difficult to comprehend the absence of a critical attitude as a manifestation of a positive

relationship towards people and the results of their work. After all, what is human about allowing a comrade to continue making errors and not helping him with at least a positive comradely word. In a broader context, low efficiency, lack of frugality, underutilization of the work day, the waste of raw materials and energy resourses are on many occasions a synonym for an uncritical attitude, for an absence of high standards set by communists for themselves and for others, especially for those who have been entrusted with the responsibility for managing work collectives. We have verified for ourselves that where a critical, comradely atmosphere exists there is no question of being content with shortcomings.

CPCZ control and auditing commissions also have their own important mission in the strengthening of the ideological and organizational unity of the Party. Party statutes bind these commissions to the consistent monitoring of the upholding of the statutes and norms of Party life. Their main responsibility is controlling the fulfillment of resolutions of the Congress and CPCZ Central Committee. They bring to accountability those who disrupt statutes, Party and state discipline, communist ethics and morals. The attention which they devote to the communication of complaints and suggestions intensifies trust in the Party and its policies on the part not only of Party members, but also those who are not members.

As a component of the organizational structure of the Party, the CPCZ control and auditing commissions exist, above all, so as to provide administrative agencies with an independent view of the upholding of statutes and the fulfillment status of the most important resolutions, thereby actively assisting in overcoming organizational and content related shortcomings in the work of agencies and organizations of the Party. Inspection results are an important source of information and knowledge for the Party.

The standing of these commissions emerges from Party statutes and Central Committee directives as that of special controlling agencies, with not executive or decision making authority (with the exception of the removal function). Only elected Party agencies have the right to manage and make decisions. They may compare their own knowledge with the findings of control and auditing commissions, on the basis of reports submitted by these commissions, objectivize this information and adopt effective measures for correcting shortcomings. The results of inspections, and their discussion within Party administrative organs, shows that committed, properly focused control activity on the part of these commissions leads to an overall increase in the quality of Party work and thereby as well to a strengthening of the unity and capability for aciton of the whole Party.

During the period of preparation for the 16th Congress, and during the practical integration of its conclusions into the life of society, into Party and social practice, the activity of the control and auditing commissions will further increase at all levels of the Party structure. The necessity of intensifying the efficiency of Party influence on the elimination of the numerous obstacles retarding more rapid forward movement was emphasized by comrade Gustav Husak at the 18th session of the CPCZ Central Committee with the words: "To resolve these shortcomings we must constantly improve the style and methods of management work. A significant strengthening of Party and state discipline, the consistent monitoring of task fulfillment, and the maintenance of strict economies, including decisive steps to reduce excessive administration, all have large roles to play. A particularly large role in this falls to communists, especially those in managerial functions in the Party, state, social, and economic spheres." (RUDE PRAVO, 8 October 1980, p. 2)

From the resolution of the CPCZ Central Committee presidium regarding the convening of annual member meetings and Party conferences comes the task for the commissions to prepare well for these gatherings and award recognition for work which has been performed, as the statutes require. The choice of cadres for newly elected commissions and the preparation of reports on their activities requires great care. We must see to it that the documents have a high political level and that they evaluate comprehensively the contribution of the control and auditing commissions to the fulfillment of the line of the 15th Congress in districts, regions, factories, and cities. We will develop our activities in the future with the same rigor with which we will evaluate our efforts towards intensifying Party influence and its controlling work.

Much work awaits us and there is no time to waste. We are resolved, therefore, to utilize all the strength and abilities of the members of the control and auditing commissions and of the numerous functionary groups. Only in this way will the control and auditing commissions be able to fulfill their responsible mission.

The control and inspection of the fulfillment of adopted tasks and resolutions is one of the most important aspects of Party work. In this sense, the controlling activity of the party is neither administrative nor economic. It is the political, collective, comprehensive control of the whole management system. Its approach to the evaluation of this or that phenomenon stems from Party positions, with an absolute respect for the interests and needs of the whole society. Sectoral interests and local patriotism are foreign to it. It is in this spirit that we will develop the controlling activity of the Party while assuring the political line and resolutions of the 16th CPCZ Congress.

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RETRAINING PROBLEMS WITH NEW HELICOPTERS DISCUSSED

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[Article by Lt Col J. Lange: "Prepare for Retraining in New Equipment in Advance and Conduct it Realistically"]

[Text] Retraining in new equipment is nothing unusual in a modern socialist army. It is an objective requirement of the revolution in military affairs. But the introduction of a new weapon system is still a very demanding and complex task which requires great attention and concentration by commanders and supervisors in their leadership activity.

The following presents experiences and problems from the engineering technical view during the introduction of modern helicopters.

1. Retraining to New Equipment — a Responsible Task

The goal of retraining is to master new equipment. This is usually achieved in three stages: in theoretical instruction, in practical retraining and in the first operations period. During theoretical instruction engineering technical personnel (ITP) gain firm knowledge about construction, aerodynamics, combat operation, servicing and maintenance of the new helicopter as well as about the documents which regulate flight operations. If engineering technical personnel have proven their knowledge in tests, they are permitted to work independently and the first operations period begins. Then knowledge and skills are stabilized to the level corresponding to complete mastery of equipment. The time required for this varies and depends on changes between the previously used and followon equipment (modification of a known basic type or new generation equipment).

In this sense mastery of new equipment means:
- that ITP of all specialities have good and very good specialized knowledge, the required state of training and the skills necessary for servicing, periodic checks and maintenance.
- assessment of wear [and] evaluation of required versus actual status are done reliably and strictly in accordance with requirements and determinations of the manufacturer and operational guides.
- dividing lines between specialized areas are recognized, mutual dependencies are mastered and become the foundation of a proven organization of labor.

- there exist firm knowledge and experience about equipment use under summer and winter conditions.
- operational experience exists which takes into account the actual climatic, geographic and territorial peculiarities.
- all required time norms have been achieved.
- all combat capabilities are receiving engineering technical support.

Anyone having to make professional leadership decisions about the commissioning of a new weapon system must be familiar with all of these. In a unit the commander, chief of the aviation engineering service and also the technical officers will be meeting their responsibility when they master this equipment. Only then will they be capable of keeping the period between conclusion of practical retraining and complete commissioning of the equipment as brief as possible. It is important to select well trained and predominantly experienced servicemen for initial retraining with the manufacturer or with another user. Their number must be sufficient to train other personnel of their own unit and to guarantee comprehensive utilization and servicing immediately after acceptance of the equipment. Participation of officers from training establishments has had a favorable effect here.

Elements of the future training base, important technological documents and organizational principles must be reviewed and formulated during the retraining.

Preparation of personnel for retraining is important to the success of retraining and for the results of the first operations period. The initial task is to make clear to all participating in retraining that a high degree of willingness to learn to the point of complete mastery of the equipment is necessary. The best conditions for this are consolidated collectives in the flights and teams. Developing pride in the new weapon system during preparation for retraining has proven itself. In this case participation in initial retraining is perceived as an honor by servicemen.

Retraining participants must be motivated on the basis of existing data about the new equipment and about the new demands that they will have to meet in the future. It must, for example, be clear to all that it is necessary to gain more comprehensive knowledge about associated speciality areas than was hitherto the case.

It has proven advantageous in the retraining preparation phase to develop a plan of measures reflecting all foreseeable activities and to further define and detail these during retraining. The most important part of this plan should be all technical-organizational, personnel and technological problems as well as all questions of support, these not being further discussed here.

2. Problems of Commissioning New Equipment

The situation at the moment of accepting the equipment or at the beginning of operations is generally marked by two characteristics. The first is engineering technical support with reduced manning since retraining of other ITP members is done in parallel with the operational period following acceptance of equipment. This requires special efforts to rapidly establish the first elements of the

future training base. The second [characteristic] is that utilization of the new equipment begins with little experience of servicing. Even if the quality of retraining is excellent, it can be seen that not all details of the equipment can be taught. The primary causes are differences in series, changed switch arrangements, small design differences and the like.

The result is that some servicemen have a degree of uncertainty while working on the equipment at the beginning of operation. A manifestation of this uncertainty is the reluctance to adapt personal, long-standing experience on the servicing and utilization of helicopters to the new equipment.

For this reason the self-confidence of these serviceman must be strengthened in daily work by various forms of continuation training and by demonstrative decisions on the basis of servicing experience. This is an important prerequisite for comprehensive acceptance of personal responsibility.

But the employment of experience from the servicing, utilization and maintenance of earlier types must be done very selectively and conscientously. Higher flight speeds, higher rotor rotation [and] changed airframe loads as a consequence of new maneuver capabilities and flight figures must, for example, be considered when evaluating damage such as dents, cracks and delaminations in the main and tail rotors. In principle, much general experience can be used, even during the transition to new generation technology.

What must be considered in maintenance of the equipment to the degree of complete mastery of it?

Before the first flight shift with the new equipment, it is necessary and useful to give a training demonstration of all servicing work such as flight preparation, preflight and takeoff checks and to rehearse. This applies equally to the inspection and repair squadron when carrying out the first 50, 100 or 200-hour checks. Planned training measures should, if possible, be done jointly with members of other, more experienced users who already know the equipment. Here cooperation with the air forces of the GSSD [Group Soviet Forces Germany] has proven itself in particular. In this way directly applicable problems are immediately solved [and] the required sureness and self-confidence in working with the new equipment are quickly and effectively developed.

Cooperation with the service brigade of the manufacturer must be well organized in the operations period. Fault finding and troubleshooting should initially be done jointly. So as to make engineering technical personnel quickly independent, the goal is to move, step-by-step but persistently, the manufacturer representatives into the role of the observer, the inspector without violating requirements relative to guarantee claims.

Established time norms are often not achieved in the first operations period. This is completely normal and is the result of the insufficient state of training of ITP. It is expedient and necessary to analyze the state of capabilities and skill at short intervals and to gradually always require more so that the time norms can be achieved. The certain and correct accomplishment of work and the

resulting guaranteeing of high flight safety are emphasized in this case. Shorter times are achievable by training, improvement of time sequences and motions. Shortcuts in the prescribed technological volume of work cannot be tolerated. It is particularly important in this period to educate all the ITP to literal accomplishment of all maintenance directive requirements. Incipient tendencies to make premature changes in the periodicity and, also in part, in the volume of prescribed technical work must be consistently blocked. Such suggestions can hardly be justified and are also usually false before the first two operations years have expired. The tendency to "tinker" on the basis of initial superficial knowledge of the equipment presents a similar picture. In the introduction of new equipment the goal is not to seek better solutions for this or that detail but rather to study and completely exploit, in the comprehensive sense, the combat properties of the new equipment.

Nor should recognizable problems in the servicing directives of the manufacturer when different operations principles are suspected (such as utilization as combat or training equipment, different annual flying hours performance and the like) lead to hasty conclusions about necessary changes.

The work of innovators and innovator collectives must be directed at creating devices, auxiliary equipment, at the analysis of technological processes of servicing, at better coordination of a variety of required activities and the like with the goal of exhausting the combat capabilities of the new equipment in a shorter time.

Questions of work coordination between speciality areas deserve a great deal of attention from ITP chiefs. In this area the modern helicopter requires a significantly greater expenditure. In the newest generation it is no exaggeration to speak of a completely new dimension of intertwining of specialty areas. A comprehensive grasp and complete mastery of these problems presupposes a logical organization of speciality area cooperation and requires a relatively large period of time. The technical officers of the aviation engineer service must always be at the top of the knowledge process, periodically evaluate the state of cooperation and precisely spell out the next steps. And here no rash actions can be taken. Sequential [work] (including partial shift operation in the initial period) must largely transition to parallel work.

Military economic requirements must also be considered. As quickly as possible, functional checks on the equipment as well as switch-on procedures and switch-on times of individual systems must be held as low as possible so that the difference between total helicopter flight time and total operational time of individual devices is kept to a minimum. The simultaneously achieved saving in fuel and electrical energy helps to improve the energy balance of the unit.

Engineering technical personnel must be educated from the first operations day on to comprehensively and conscientously find and profoundly analyze all faults which appear. This will make it possible to employ analytical material for fault finding and qualification, to create foundations for real spare parts consumption norms and to derive conclusions for the utilization, servicing and maintenance. Then decisions can be also reached on many questions and determinations made for

all the cases the manufacturer has not or has determined only in general terms or when local conditions have to be considered. The recommendation here is to select an expandable form (card file or the like) which will contain all these instructions with justification.

Thus the leading flying and engineering technical personnel will be able to consider such problems, especially the assignment of additional personnel, without lengthy preparation in the framework of continuation training and repetition. There will also be continually available material if servicing directives or other technological documents have to be revised.

The problems presented here refer to a concrete situation. Given other conditions, other equipment or other personnel prerequisites, the emphasis could be completely different [and] problems not mentioned here could arise.

Retraining in new equipment requires the entire attention of leading personnel in the broadest sense. The prerequisite is that this task is perceived not as a technological or organizational process but rather that the man-machine relationship is continually analyzed. The problems arising here must be recognized on a timely basis, solved immediately and completely with the goal of guaranteeing the combat value, the real usability of the new equipment as quickly and as certainly as possible.

8373
CSO: 2300

ARMY'S TASKS IN SIXTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN DISCUSSED

Budapest NEPHADSEREG in Hungarian No 51-52, 20 Dec 80

[Article by Major Sandor Kiss: "The Five-Year Plan and the Army"]

[Text] At its session on 17-18 December the National Assembly enacted a plan law, and now only a few days separate us from the beginning of the Sixth Five-Year Plan. At the same time the Fifth Five-Year Plan period will expire. In working out the execution of this plan, under conditions that were more difficult than expected, substantial results were achieved: the material-technical basis of socialism was strengthened and our economy developed. But we also know that several important plan goals were not realized because of the worsening of the terms of trade in foreign exchange and a lag behind what was necessary in exportable production. In December 1978 the party's Central Committee passed a resolution: the main task of economic work is to improve the external equilibrium of the economy, guard and consolidate the living standard already attained. The party's 12th Congress affirmed this economic political direction, and this was also the starting point of the Sixth Five-Year Plan.

The new five-year plan set as the goal the strengthening of the economic bases of progress, the assurance of a planned and balanced development, the consolidation of the living standard already attained, and by adjustment to possibilities the improvement of living conditions. This requires a rise in the level of economic planning, guidance and management, the modernization of production, the utilization of the results of science and technology, and the development of international economic cooperation.

The MSZMP Central Committee approved the main goals of the economic plan as follows. National income should increase by 14-17 percent, industrial production by 19-22 percent, agricultural production by 12-15 percent, per capita real income by 6-7 percent. A very important goal of the plan is that the 1,020 to 1,040 billion forints designed for investments in the producer branches should satisfy above all the needs of international competibility, developments for the improvement of the equilibrium, and in the nonproducer branches the most important social requirements.

Requirements and Possibilities

In drafting the Sixth Five-Year Plan of our Army we had to consider in a far-reaching way the negative trends which have taken place in international political life,

the security of the socialist camp, the requirements stemming from mutually felt responsibility, and last but not least our own economic possibilities in such a way that the main goals of the five-year plan could be realized.

Now that the Sixth Five-Year Plan, including the development goals of the Hungarian Army, have been approved, it can be stated that despite the unfavorable factors we succeeded in preparing a medium term plan which takes into account the tasks stemming from the defense of our country and from our obligations as allies, and at the same time it counts on the internal economic possibilities of our country.

The main idea of the Army development plan under thw Sixth Five-Year Plan is to pursue, in accordance with our possibilities, a balanced technical development of our Army which assures keeping pace with the rate of armament by the NATO member states. And in addition to acquiring new, modern technical means, to bring about such efficient organization and training conditions as will, with the least expenditure, assure a high level of combat readiness by our Army.

A rise in the moral-political condition and in the level of leadership so that the personnel will be capable, even in the most complicated situation, consciously to undertake the defense of our national and international interests.

A rise in the level of military management to the degree that it will fully satisfy the expectations of the economy vis-a-vis every branch, above all that within the fund limits made available to us we shall be able to assure, through economical management, the carrying out of the tasks related to development and combat readiness.

Characteristics of Technical Development

The following are the most characteristic features of technical development. We are acquiring more and more complicated means and systems of means which will in practice affect all the weapon types of our Army. To put the new means into a system will require the combined activity of many organs from high level managing organs to the troops inclusively. Most of the new means are investment intensive, their completion may take years, and therefore the decisions on the realization of the investments must be made in time and strict discipline must be maintained in implementation.

A relatively short time is available to put certain means into the system, something which will require great foresight and strict planning and implementation discipline. One of the important characteristics of the coming period will be large-scale automation which will put greater demands on leadership, and because of the complexity of the means will make it necessary to have increasingly better prepared servicemen. Such preparedness must be started in time. Last but not least, it follows from the foregoing that it requires many new organization elements to put the new technical means into the system, and in addition--considering the complexity of the means--it will be necessary to have such modernization in training and preparation as will assure a high level of skills by the soldiers with the least costs. This is not a simple task even now in the planning period, but we will have problems particularly in the execution. The fact that we must prepare the men to handle more complex technologies and their military use--with

the least cost possible--requires very serious foresight, and the combined activity of many organs and men. I believe that in this matter we can to a great degree rely on the one most interested, the rank-and-file soldier under training.

I attribute great importance to the moral and political condition and to a rise in the level of leadership also because the Sixth Five-Year Plan requires in ever respect citizens who are of firm conviction, confident in the realization of the goals and active in this interest, and in the army soldiers are of this type.

Optimum Expenditure, Savings

Our greatest tasks are in the area of increasing the effectiveness of military management. By military management we mean the activity directed at making the Hungarian Army combat ready at the least material, financial and intellectual cost. First of all, therefore, we must exactly conceive what optimum expenditure is necessary for carrying out the tasks determined at the various levels. If we can define this, the rest is a simpler problem. I regard it, therefore, as basic that our total tasks, training, maintenance, investment, etc., should be defined by norms and normatives in the interest of maintaining combat readiness. It is one of the most important tasks of the coming period to work this out.

It is no less an important task to define from the rank-and-file soldier to the commanding general what is the role he must fulfill. Experience shows that it is of no use to pass down measures from above if these are not understood in their execution. Therefore we must make progress in the formation of consciousness and in the guarding of the materials of even the smallest value intrusted to the care of one person. As a second measure, we can set as our goal the more economic use of materials and means. There are two reasons for this. One is that economy is the civil responsibility of everyone; the other is that it is well known to us that in the coming five-year plan the state organs, including the armed forces, will not enjoy ample cost provisions. In this area we can count on maintaining our level or on minimum development possibilities in certain fields. Thus we must organize the management of the Army in such a way that we will obtain the greatest results possible from the possibilities available to us.

In what areas do I see the possibility for more rational and efficient management? First of all, in the field of training tasks. Since we spend most of the quotas available to us on these tasks, even a slight increase in training efficiency may result in important savings. It is well known that the saving of one maintenance hour on military airplance can save several tens of thousands of forints and in the case of tanks several hundreds of thousands of forints.

In this area we must strive to see that with the use of training aids and the most efficient preparation of training tasks there will be a reduction in the number of exercises for carrying out live military maneuvers. With this we can achieve dual savings. The reduction in live maneuvers will reduce the total training costs, and in addition less repair and maintenance material will be necessary, which will also result in savings. In practice, every officer, noncommissioned officer, and rank-and-file soldier can contribute to savings in training costs, and therefore we need to carry out enlightenment and persuasion work in this area over the widest scope.

The guarding of military technical means also serves more efficient management. According to statistics, our Army--with variation by outfits--uses more than a half million forints per capita in the value of military techniques. The rank-and-file soldiers, platoon, company battalion and regiment commanders must assure the guarding of great quantities and values of military means. This can be conceived only if everyone accepts maximum responsibility for the means intrusted to him, and if he has outstandingly mastered the processes of handling, maintenance and repair. One wrong movement, irresponsible or negligent control before use can cause loss of military technical means costing millions, or even loss of human life.

Therefore, workers with military technical means--considering these means are increasingly more expensive and complicated--must perform their jobs still more conscientiously and understandingly. In this way, too they can contribute to more efficient management. And the same is true of guarding other materials used in the Army. In the interest of the execution of training tasks, the continuous assurance of combat readiness, and the maintenance of everyday life, we use in the Army an important quantity of food, clothing, fuels, energy, building materials and other materials. I do not think it is particularly necessary to convince anyone that the systematic storage of these materials, their careful use and more rational application can result in the savings of many millions.

Efficient Work and Rationalizations

The ideas developed for acquiring technical means and improving living and working conditions which play a role in the Sixth Five-Year Plan require investments. This also makes it necessary for us to operate our own building organs and to carry out our own independent investment and building tasks. In this area the goal is that starting with the requirements, building-implementation work should meet standards in an increasingly better way, while at the same time quality is of a high level and the costs are the lowest attainable.

Nearly 25 percent of our Army personnel is serving some kind of service, productive activity at our state organs, our enterprises, or our troops. For the Sixth Five-Year Plan period we can set as our goal in this field the efficient use of live manpower, rationalization maintenance in operation of our machine equipment, and savings in energy and materials. Of course, we want to do this in such a way that the quality of the work performed will increase.

All this is well served by the renovation and rationalization work being conducted in our army. In the Fifth Five-Year Plan period the results achieved in this area were stabilized; many renovation and rationalization measures were born which on one hand resulted in significant material savings, and on the other hand contributed to raising the level of combat readiness. In the coming five-year plan period this area also will have to be subordinated to the interests of more efficient work and more economic solutions.

In the foregoing I wished to call attention to our possibilities in the area of carrying out the most important processes. All the more so because in the future we must take note in our management that the scissor has widened wider between needs and possibilities. Therefore, the responsibility is greater to create harmony between requirements and possibilities.

On balance, I see our main management tasks in that we should broadly apply the requirements of rational savings to materials, money, time, personnel, and to superfluous, avoidable tasks alike. In forming our material reserves we must rely more than heretofore on the possibilities of our economy. In all areas of training, supply and everyday life we must strive for rational task organization, the search for and application of new methods. We must regard the widening use of good management methods as a basic task. Let us rely more on the economic committees, and let us require new initiatives. Let us increase at every level the economic training and the skill of our cadres, and let us make the proper management outlook a general one.

6691
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KOROM INTERVIEWED ON POLITICAL TASKS OF NEW YEAR

Budapest PARTELET in Hungarian No 1, Jan 81 pp 3-7

[Interview with Mihaly Korom, member of the Politburo, no date or place given]

[Text] [Question] How can we evaluate the socio-political situation of our country, and the political balance of the past year at the beginning of the new year?

[Answer] On the basis of our political accounting of the past year, we may say that all in all we have left behind us a successful period. Our society is characterized by spirited and bustling political life.

In the past year there have been such important political events as the 12th Party Congress, the National Assembly and council elections, the trade union congresses, and the drafting and approval of the new 5-year plan--to mention only the most important. We have left behind us an eventful year which did not lack for constructive exchange of ideas. On the basis of a careful weighing of all the circumstances, we have surveyed the needs, strengths and possibilities of our society, and we defined the tasks. The past year was also a year of dialog on a great social scale when we weighed our actual relations and we openly and frankly revealed our problems and our results as well as our sometimes slightly and sometimes strongly strained contradictions, marking at the same time the path to their solution.

In sum, we may say that the working millions, the workers, the cooperative peasants, the intellectuals and other working classes actively support the policy conducted by our party for almost a quarter of a century. This is shown by the everyday results of creative-productive work and by the sense of obligation, the maturity, the patriotic and international attitude which our people gave witness to in important domestic and foreign political problems of the past year.

Socialist national unity was further strengthened with our work, as well as the historically significant unity of our people, the worker-peasant federation, and the political consciousness and readiness of the working millions to act. We made socialist democracy the essential feature of our system more effective, and we developed our state life.

Reflecting on these things we can say with assurance that the domestic political situation in our country is solid, the working class is strong, and that the people's power, the leading role of the party is being realized appropriately. The national wealth has increased, and the socialist production relations have been strengthened. We have made progress in building a developed socialist society.

We may speak of our achievements with pleasure before the whole nation and world, for these did not fall into our laps by themselves but we earned them with hard work. We give thanks to our party membership and the devoted and industrious labor of our working people. Our successes are all the more valuable because we achieved them under more difficult external economic conditions and in a more strained international situation.

In this situation our party and government continued to strengthen in the past year relations with our socialist allies and our unity with every revolutionary, democratic and peace-loving force. They worked consistently in the interest of peace and security and the maintenance of detente. All this bore witness of our people's resolute desire for peace and increased the international respect of our country.

[Question] The year 1981 is the beginning of a new plan period. How does this affect the work of the party organizations?

[Answer] We are starting a new decade in 1981. The most important social event in the life of our country is the beginning of the Sixth Five-Year Plan. The main goal of our economic building work in this year, too, is to strengthen and broaden the economic bases of socialist development and to develop in a planned and balanced way. We want to guard thereby the living standard already achieved and improve our living conditions.

If we look at our Sixth Five-Year Plan in the light of known figures, we see that the rate of economic development as a whole will be more moderate. This is all we can realistically plan because we have to devote great energies to restoring the balance and to quality factors. I would like to add, however, that the fulfillment of these tasks requires of all of us not less but greater efforts. That is why in its 2 December 1980 session the Central Committee called on the Party organizations, all communists, and the workers of our country to perform their work in accordance with the higher requirements and to concentrate all their strength to carry out the tasks facing our country. Thus no one is promising an easier period. Personal example, firmness, and initiative-taking, actively responsible and disciplined work will have outstanding importance in promoting and consolidating the sound processes which developed over the past years and are gradually being strengthened. In this work we are building on every supporter of socialism. Our party continues to regard it as an obligation of prime importance that it should strengthen its ties with the working class, the masses, and consistently conduct the federation policy which has proved successful.

[Question] Two outstanding domestic political events of the new year will be the congress of the Patriotic People's Front and of KISZ [Hungarian Communist Youth League]. With what major ideas are the members and the organizations of the party preparing for these events?

[Answer] Both congresses will be important political events in our social life. They will decide in detail what tasks are to fall to the people's front movement, the youth federation in the coming years in realizing the nation-building program that was defined at the 12th Congress and which is to the benefit of the entire nation.

The people's front movement plays an important social and political role in our country. It builds and strengthens mutual confidence between the party and the working people, socialist national unity, broad social solidarity which is one of the main pledges of our socialist progress. The people's front movement makes its voice heard and acts in the cause of nation building, takes a position on every essential political, social and legal political question, is active in the development of socialist democracy, and does much to strengthen friendship among peoples and in the defense of peace. Its activity well expresses the fact that the successful building of a new society is not only the affair and interest of the communists but all honorable Hungarian citizens. We continue unchanged our policy that in Hungary every suitable person, thus nonparty persons as well, can fulfill any leading assignment, with the exception of party functions. In the spirit of our constitution we assure everyone freedom of conscience, and that there are good conditions for the cooperation of believers and nonbelievers alike with different world outlooks in building the country and in realizing benefits for our people and political goals that serve to improve our nation.

The people's front movement also has important reserves among other places in residential areas, in scattered villages, and in the tanya [scattered outlaying farms] world. It also has great possibilities—and this is particularly important --for working still more effectively among certain classes of intellectuals. These tasks place greater requirements on the working communists in the people's front movement, and on the party organizations. Our party members should continue to be the motive force, helpers, and organizers in the still more substantial work of the movement, in the unity of all honorable working people, and in the consolidation of national unification.

The Communist Youth League includes more than 850,000 young people in its ranks. We are pleased to say that the overwhelming majority of the Hungarian youth regards the socialist society we are building as a natural condition of life, they work for it, study, and fulfill their military defense obligations. The everyday facts of life verify that we can build on the youth and count on them. Their situation is indivisible, of course, from that of the society as a whole, its joys and its cares. It is an important obligation of our party organizations, of the communists, that they should give incentive to support, and guide in a proper direction the initiative bent, momentum and critical spirit of our youth, and satisfy their interest in public life. The work of the Communist Youth League can develop further if the party organizations, at every level, stimulate the youth organizations, the young communists to intelligent, purposeful and specific

tasks. We can also appear successfully before the youth in opposition to negative phenomena with political education work based on conviction and free of formulas. The personal examples set by the older members, and chiefly the communists, is also very important from this point of view.

We well know that the family, the school, the work place, and the environment as a whole shapes the future generation. Therefore, we avow that the education of the youth and their preparation for adult life is the concern and interest of the entire society. It is the honoring task of the party organizations and the communists that they should urge and help young people to join in the active life of society, with particular attention to those beginning their careers, those first entering on a job, and on easing the problems of establishing a family.

[Question] What important practical tasks do we have in the field of strengthening and further developing socialist democracy and the main political goals of the 12th Congress? How can we further perfect the operational mechanism of our political system?

[Answer] The Congress also affirmed the earlier political conclusion built on experiences that one of the main conditions for successfully carrying out our tasks, overcoming our difficulties, and shaping socialist man is broadening and development of socialist democracy. We are not speaking of a temporary and a tactical slogan but of one of the essential and always effective features of our system, the fact that the workers actually exercise their own power.

In Hungary, the forums of socialist democracy have developed and are functioning more and more substantively. The social experiences of the millions of citizens, their creative initiative, their recognition of what serves progress, their critical observations, which lash at negative phenomena like, for example, bureaucratism, indifference, and inaction, come to the surface at these forums. In the future we will not need to worry about new organizational forms, rather we should fill the existing frameworks with more lively, effervescent and worthy substance.

The further perfection of socialist democracy is closely related to the strengthening of party democracy, since the two can be realized appropriately only in mutual relationship. When party democracy is being strengthened and the forums of socialist democracy are functioning as they are designed to and with substance, then there is possibility for the varying interests to surface, for a clash of differing concepts and ideas, and in the final analysis for the appropriate harmony of group and individual interests to be realized with the social interests. Of course, a given question can be debated or even solved from various approaches, but in the end the social interests must everywhere be realized.

Our public life and our whole socialist system will gain if we reply with democratic methods and forms to the problems raised and conceived in life. Therefore it is a regrettable factor that despite a development there is still a great deal of formalism operating in the democratic forums. In some places they satisfy superficially and formally the demands of the workers that they should receive worthy information on the important problems regarding the life of

a city, village, factory or cooperative, but this is the only way they can comment worthily on the problems of smaller and large communities and share in the decisions. In every area it is necessary actually to realize the basic socialist relation that the workers are not only work undertakers but are also at the same time the possessors and exercisers of worker power.

Of course, socialist democracy is not a "one-way street." It not only assures rights but also assumes the fulfillment of obligations. In socialism, to use the language of sports, there cannot be separate seats for the passive spectators and a separate arena for the active players, that is we cannot have a "work distribution" in which certain people only insist on and demand their rights while others work and produce. It is the task of every collective and every honorable worker to help in the perfection of socialist democracy. It is only in this way that the creative powers of our people can truly develop and the socialist features of our society grow. In our system it is a basic truth and reality that the formation and development of our policy is not the concern and obligation of several dozen or several hundred people, but of all those who want a brighter, better and happier future.

[Question] This year in all certainty the work directed at carrying out the resolutions of the 12th Congress will develop to a still broader extent. In this connection what are now the most important tasks in further strengthening the action unity of the party?

[Answer] It often appears to be an obvious platitude when we say that our party is unified, strong and is thus fulfilling its role. This statement, however, can be demonstrated by thousands of facts of life. The most important thing is that our people have confidence in the party and support it in an active way.

We cannot, however, conceive of our party's action unity in such a way that when it is once created we have nothing more to do in this field. We have many everyday tasks to do in the further strengthening of our unity. Action unity exists only where political, ideological and organizational unity has developed. We must create and recreate over and over again political unity in every question, everywhere. To do this, we must actively participate in working out given concrete tasks, and conduct debates at the appropriate forums because this is one of the important conditions of unity, but after the decision let us be united in carrying out the decisions. Let us represent our policy consistently, let us defend with feeling and conviction the positions we have developed mutually, keeping in mind what we demonstrate daily with our lives and work: our party and the communists serve the people.

[Question] The external and internal conditions of socialist building work are tied to one another by many threads. In this mutual effect what are the international relations and factors which now have the greatest political importance in our everyday work?

[Answer] The world political situation is never simple, but we now live in a particularly complicated world, one of the constituents being that the factors of detente and tension exist together in the international situation. Within this,

however, the elements of tension have been strengthened in the recent period in wake of the activation of extremist circles of imperialism.

The countries of the socialist community took steps to stop and change the unfavorable trend in unity with all other peace desiring countries. And although the situation is still tense and the arms race continues, the fact is that in recent times the political contacts and discussions among countries with different social systems have become more lively. A role is also played in this by the fact that among the political leaders of the capitalist countries also there is a recognition that if a nuclear catastrophe is to be avoided it is necessary to remove the tremendous dangers threatening the peace of human kind. Both the small and the large states are directly affected by and interested in this.

From the point of view of our socialist development, of greatest importance will be the fact that the countries of the socialist community are progressing with the building of a new society, that the political, economic and defensive strength of the community is increasing, and the international unity of the states is being consolidated. An important factor for us, too, is a closer unity of all three revolutionary currents. Our essential interest is linked to the development of relations with capitalist states on the basis of a policy of peaceful coexistence. To do our building work, we continue to need peace and security in order that detente should be permanent and solid.

Socialism and peace are twins, the two are indivisible. This not only means that the forces of socialism create the most secure support of peace but also that the results of our building work form the most solid background for our international activity. In the future, too, we can best contribute to the defense of peace if we continue to achieve successes in the work of building our country. In addition, we are actively conducting a foreign policy that is built on solid principles and is flexible in practice.

We are developing manysided relations with the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community. We are advancing together with all forces that strive for peace and social progress. We oppose every imperialist provocation, we devote appropriate attention to the modernization of our armed forces, the strengthening of our combat readiness, the development of our alliance system, and the reliable defense of our socialist achievements.

These efforts are in full harmony with the position of the other states in the Warsaw Pact as shown by the communique issued by the leaders of the member states at the Moscow conference in December 1980. The MSZMP Political Committee--valuing highly the unified position taken at the Moscow meeting--emphasized as an important sign-post, from the viewpoint of our party's entire work, that in the future also we will share actively in joint political measures. We are convinced that with the joint efforts of all countries and peoples we can assure the further progress of the detente process and the guarding of peace.

6691
CSO: 2500

WESTERN PRESS CRITICIZED ON TREATMENT OF EVENTS IN POLAND

Paris LE FIGARO in French 2 Jan 81 p 2

[Article by Stefan Bratkowski]

[Text] Stefan Bratkowski, a writer, sociologist and journalist, had for 7 years been deprived of all functions. He belongs, in fact, to the party's most liberal wing. Today, he is playing a prominent political role and has just been elected president of the Association of Polish Journalists [SDP]. It is in this capacity that he wished to express his views here on the way that the Western press is reporting events in Poland.

"For the last 4 months, Poland has not been absent from the columns of the world press. During the same 4-month period, there has not been the slightest clash, at least for political reasons. No windows have been broken, and far less alcohol has been consumed than at any other time since World War II. There has been no strike for 2 weeks and yet the world press and foreign radios are calling upon the Poles to be calm, inviting them to control themselves. They are being discreetly shown the dramatic prospects for disaster open to them by the tense political situation. What is really going on in Poland?

"Well, now much is going on. Events are principally taking place in world press columns, over the radio waves and on television screens. Too many of my colleagues are coming to Poland knowing in advance what is going on and having an a priori explanation ready for everything. We even find one or two persons in the country who are acting on such explanations, even though these involve individuals whom no one in Warsaw listens to, even in private.

"A process of sensationalism has been created as well as of fear that feeds upon itself. One influential magazine, NEWSWEEK, offers headlines of this kind: "Poland: A Challenge to Moscow." After that, they are astonished that Moscow becomes edgy. The most trivial comment made by one of the young and politically inexperienced leaders of worker trade unions numbering several million members is picked up. There is publication of articles by persons who are quite sure of themselves, which are written in good faith but are not always very intelligent; and then everyone takes an uneasy look at Moscow to see how it will react. How amusing it is to tease the elephant! Particularly when the teaser finds himself safely a good distance away. What an enjoyable game! At the expense of others.

"Good old FIGARO is one of the positive exceptions; however, I cannot persuade my Soviet friends to read such an such newspaper instead of another. They read them all. What is more, there are persons in Poland who, for their own interests, would do anything to convince our neighbors that our country is in a state of political apocalypse. The circle closes on itself.

"However, this picture of 'the fall of socialism,' 'the breakup of the party,' 'the challenge to Moscow,' has no relationship to reality. This picture is independent of reality or even the opposite of it. I am a calm person with a certain sense of humor which prevents me from having political ambitions. That is why I see things the way they are and not as I would like them to be. I explain to my fellow countrymen, if there are those who doubt it, that cooperation with the Soviet Union, on the basis of honest partner principles, is in the best interests of Poland. Of course, as recently as a few months ago, I was considered a dangerous agitator; however, that was at a time when good sense seemed to be a revolutionary proposition, at a time of 'real socialism' which was in fact a 'surreal socialism' of the 'great dada.'"

A Firmly Anchored Socialism

"With others, I was also smart enough to have clearly seen quite early, to have announced the crisis, which was not very difficult to do. Just 3 months ago, when I predicted a powerful renewal movement within the party, I was scorned. Today, 2 million rank and file members of the party, basically workers, are showing their faces, using their real language. We have just seen people ready to go on a hunger (sic!) strike so that the party card of an improperly expelled member would be returned to him!

"Therefore, I have some right to attempt to somewhat calm down the foreign observers. The ideas of socialism have deep roots in Poland. Social justice, equality, the right to an education, to health protection, are taken seriously. No one is thinking about giving the factories back to the capitalists. We only want to--we must!--put our economy in order. No one, except for a few rather unthinking individuals, is questioning our alliances. On the contrary, there is a possibility today of having them accepted wholeheartedly by the people. The party is not collapsing. The government itself is not falling apart. The new trade unions really intend to be trade unions and nothing else.

"Of course, I recognize that it is not easy to know and understand this country. A few days, a few weeks or even a few months of sojourn in the country are not enough. There are many specific characteristics and paradoxes. What is more, there will still be many tensions and complications. The government does not know how to adapt to the new situation, and the people are not prepared for it. The source of various conflicts has not disappeared, and the lack of goodwill or capability of certain government officials can cause other conflicts. There is no program; many problems have not found a concrete solution; the authorities are reacting nervously and all the more so because nervousness reigns about them. They are still making a lot of mistakes. Moreover, even with a better agricultural policy, the food supply will not improve before next fall.

"However, it is not by force, whatever form it may take, that we are going to resolve these problems; and there is no force which will pay our $23-billion debt. What, then, do we need? The patience of our friends and good sense at least from those who do not like us. We will come out of this. We have had to come out of much more difficult situations; and history has taught us many very hard lessons. I think that this time, again, we will know how to restore order to our house. I do not believe that anyone is coming here to set fire to it. A fire has never been a way to restore order. We are optimists; what is more, we have no other solution."

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LAMENTOWICZ'S VIEWS ON DIRECTIONS OF POLITICAL REFORM NOTED

Warsaw INNOWACJE in Polish No 44, 2 Nov 80 pp 11-13

[Article by Wojciech Lamentowicz: "Political Reform--Indispensable or Supplementary?"]

[Text] Among the many concepts of directions for economic reform, the trend of thought perceiving the political conditionings of economic crises stands out in too feeble a relief. The breakdown in confidence in the centers of authority and the crisis of authority are most frequently explained in terms of the signs of an economic crisis. Even when references are made to subjective errors and arbitrariness in economic policies, such errors are not seen as an inevitable product of a faulty structure of political power.

Contrary to such superficial views, political error results not only from the ineptness, stupidity or dishonesty of particular persons performing managerial functions. In and by themselves, personal identities of politicians and administrators are not a source of organizational chaos, irregular economic growth, excessive costs and, finally, persistent economic imbalances.

Personal identities and character make-up of the cadres are predicated on the structure of authority and both on formal and informal rules of the game played within the mechanisms of authority.

Bureaucratism, focussing on a career of the vertical type and personal security, lack of effective control by society, unrestrained centralism, and even abuse of authority come as the consequences of contradictions that have stood forth in the political system.

Most detrimental for the economy and culture are those distortions of the political system that have been with us for more than three decades. These dysfunctional traits in politico-administrative structures of authority are, in the first place, monocentricism, interpenetration of party apparatus and state apparatus, coalescence of political and economic power, and emancipation of [particular] mechanisms. These features tend to lead to anonymity of leadership centers and covert forcing through of artificial unanimity in collegial bodies. In turn, people who operate under cultural and institutional conditions of this kind lose the ability to design social innovation. Because they are rarely capable of open discussion of divergent views in public debate, they prefer to

stifle criticism and, covertly, in their office rooms, reach the state in which it can be said that "a decision was made." It is unknown who made the decision. It remains unknown who the decisionmaker was, what he wanted to achieve and what options he had considered and then rejected. Simply put, there comes down an anonymous bidding that is not justified by reflection, being instead an expression of unqualified belief in the existence of the "one best way."

Forced unanimity leads to political and economic programs being for the most part very general, vague and enigmatic. They are designed in this manner to avoid raising controversy. Once an indefinite formulation is unanimously accepted, however, divergent interests and views come to the fore. Prior to decisionmaking, it is "out of place" to question generalities in the contents of a project handed down from top. It is better to keep silent and vote "for," concealing one's own opinion. As soon as the unanimous decision is made, there starts a full play of interests, manipulation of the truth and backroom bargaining among bureaucrats. Thus, a unanimous decision, made without a manifested breakdown into a minority and a majority, had by no means been agreed upon. In fact, divergent views furtively begin to block its implementation. This is why so many justified and loosely worded resolutions are never put into practice. Because they are indefinite, it is difficult to determine whether they have been implemented and who is responsible for failure to implement them, if such is the case.

The power structure's built-in rules for covert mitigation of conflicts, along with a rigidly understood political discipline, are isolating the decision-making centers from society's views and expert opinion. A socially unchecked, hidden interplay of parochial interests cannot generate respect for society-wide reason. The alienation of political authority and a heavily politicized economy form an explosive mixture which cyclically replicates errors of economic policy, optimistic arbitrariness in planning and the disproportions in socioeconomic life.

The politicizing of the economic structure works on two levels. The state mechanism is in immediate control of property and the major provider of jobs, furthermore, it is controlled to excess by the party apparatus and not enough by the citizenry. The adverse effects of such interlinking of authority and ownership, or politics and economics, can be overcome only by a comprehensive reform of the political system. For reforms to be socially effective, they must begin with a reform of the political system, to be followed by reforms of management, planning and economic organization. A reform of political relations, especially in the party system and the state system, is a necessary precondition for a successful reform of planning and economic management.

New economic indexes, a decentralization of economic management or increased autonomy of enterprises will fall short of permitting the disappearance of the predominance of political and administrative will in society's cost and balance sheet. Only a socialization of authority can assure transition from state ownership to genuinely social ownership. This is why it is indispensable for the economy as well, to have openness in political life, legal restrictions on censorship, changes in electoral laws in the state, and in parties and social organizations, a deliberative style of governance and multi-option planning of major decisions, to be consulted with citizens in draft. In the absence of this modicum of political conditions, it would be difficult to expect organized

irresponsibility and a sense of inerrancy to disappear, the workers' inherent rights as co-owners to be respected, and the nation's consumer needs to be equitably met.

How Are Development Goals To Be Designed?

When formulating goals (e.g., objectives for a development strategy, for a reform policy, or economic management), it is useful to consider several trends related with the level of industrialization and levels of consciousness in different segments of society.

1. An era of self-evident goals, fairly easy to gain understanding in society, has come to an end. These days one cannot simply ask whether we are for or against socialism. It is no longer the question of choosing one of the horns of a dilemma over the other. These days, a specific question must be asked--what kind of socialistm are you for? At what social cost do you wish to achieve it? On what basis do you regard certain goals as more advantageous than other?

2. It is for these reasons that a strong relationship between the level of satisfaction of needs (an avowed objective of economic management) and genuineness of social support for the political system deserve to be respected. The citizenry's genuine support for structures of authority is predicated on meeting their needs, not only those related with production and consumption. This is only a necessary condition and not a sufficient one. Even if availability of consumer goods is achieved, it should not become a surrogate for civic dignity. If socialism is to fulfill its ideological promises, it needs a substantial mitigation of the contradiction between a concept of a prosperous consumer society and a concept of society of dignity and solidarity. Political and economic democracy is the route leading to a synthesis of consumer prosperity, high productivity and civic dignity. The way in which these values are understood, however, is likely to vary considerably. A public debate on the significance of goals and values is therefore needed.

3. Serious and thorough consideration should be given the tendency to universalize goals and values (e.g., Poland--her neighbor countries--Europe--mankind). The international context has already become so important that the national thought, if deprived of a continental or global dimension, is a blatant anachronism. While designing the goals for Poland, it should not be forgottem that our country is a part of a local system of alliances, a part of the European continent and a part of the world. This external environment is perhaps the source of beliefs [?] but it so be a source of inspiration.

Conflicts of ideas and interests generate not only subversive mechanisms. They also offer good opportunities to learn creatively from one's experience.

4. There is a distinct tendency for a growing diversity of goals to be simultaneously accepted by modern man. Multi-criterion choices multiply. Mutual independence of moral, intellectual and political evaluations intensifies, while there is progressively less cohesion in value systems. Being right is more frequently divisible these days (everyone is right "to a certain extent" or

"in some respects"), which removes all premises for a monopoly on truth and correctness. The ongoing pluralization of goals, values and opinions is a cultural fact that offers a challenge to monocentric, generally rather rigid, political and economic structures. A monopoly on ownership, authority or information always constitutes a constraint on human energy. If the ruling groups strive to give it an ideological legitimacy, their monopolist aspirations are in contradiction with the chances of industrial civilizations to survive. Skillful avoidance of conservative compromises is no less important than curbing tendencies to arbitrary imposition of order-ranked goals.

How Do We Reform?

While selecting a style for reflection, discussion and implementation of reforms, it is useful to apply the "five K's" formula.

1. Design systemic innovations in politics and the economy comprehensively, rather than sporadically and in only a few managerial bailiwicks.

2. Design and implement reforms under genuine social monitoring with a sense of responsibility towards public opinion, especially with regard to those segments of society whose energy is crucial for success of these reforms. Many reforms have failed for one reason alone, that they were removed from public scrutiny and debated on only in bureaucrats' offices.

3. Propose specific, clearly defined ends and means, rather than "deepening," "strengthening," "improvement" and "continued development."

4. Consistently implement that which has obtained social consensus, rather than retreating after a year. A reformer must be patient, moving with calm and measured steps with a clear vision of even remoter goals.

5. Nothing is better than open criticism, concurrent with the implementation of decisions, to permit undelayed discovery of adverse results and change of a decision before it leads to further deterioration.

How then, do we reform? Comprehensively, under public scrutiny, with definiteness, consistency and openness to criticism. To that end, it is necessary to allow for the emergency of differing concepts of reform, and their public discussion to reach consensus or select one out of several many options. Today, we think in isolation, each on his own or in a small circle of people, and, seemingly, we think homogenously. Vitally needed is an ability to think together (overtly, openly, publicly, without understatement), yet at the same time heterogenously. This is the specifically human, social mode of thinking about public matters.

Our discussions exhibit excessive institutional distances among their participants, and too little variation in views and ideas--genuine and free from anonymity. We must say "I think" instead of "It is believed" or "It is generally assumed." Openness and individualized lines of thinking will help multiply the diversity and intellectual content of our ideas. In addition, they will reduce sharp institutional distances because it will be evident in open debate that position in institutional hierarchy does not necessarily match the heights of thought striving to design systemic transformation.

In this situation, uniformity in implementation activities will be based on completely disclosed and partially agreed opinions, rather than--as used to be the case--on totally concealed divergences and ostensibly agreed strivings. It is better to know position differences than to pretend there are none. Also, it is better to develop methods to solve natural conflicts of interests than to rely on cliches about moral and political unity. In consequence, spheres of bureaucratic dominance and technocratic manipulation are curtailed and there are increased opportunities for dialog on a partnership level, devoid of patronizing gestures and moral mentorizing, and without excessive recourse to slogans functioning as magic incantations.

Social, Democratic and Dialectical Planning

Our methods of central planning are fairly universally criticized at this time. It is pointed out, correctly, that quarterly and yearly plans are a poorer regulatory method than five-year plans.

Another equally correct view is that socially unchecked segmental interests of the ministries and the government administration apparatus have paralyzed the central planning system. We know, moreover, that an attempt to generate pressures for plans to be exceeded rather than only fulfilled, causes strains in the balance of means of production. This kind of planning to expand tasks is bound to disorganize the economy, rather than putting it in harmony. In effect, the economy is a planned economy only at first glance; actually, it is dominated by anarchistic bargaining and bureaucratic impulses. The elimination of market uncontrollability is the never-fulfilled promise of the planners who are themselves immersed in an unchecked bureaucracy. This new, nonmarket uncontrolled force is in evidence in the excesses of command indexes, that hamstring initiative and resourcefulness in production organizations. A glaringly visible barrier to efficiency is the preponderance of gross indexes over net criteria, which makes waste "profitable." Although justified on good grounds, are these lines of criticism of planning sufficient? I believe that they are manifestations of an inherent, narrowly economic critique of the planning mechanism. To move beyond the confines of this type of criticism, sociological, political and socio-philosophical vistas are indispensable. These three perspectives should rank on at least an equal footing with the economic approach to improvements in the planning machinery.

1. A sociological point of view requires the development of social planning, statistics and social forecasts. In the 1960s there existed only economic planning, while social policies could count on a very modicum of means. In the 1970s, concepts of socioeconomic planning appeared. Emphasis in plans began to be placed on social objectives (e.g., wages, consumption, social benefits, culture and education), and not on tons of steel, coal and cement alone. As the experience of 1975-80 has demonstrated, however, the primacy of social goals was not respected by centers of economic authority. The formula of "vigorous economic growth for the sake of social objectives and needs" remained a declaration of intent, implemented only in part. We were reminded about it by the massive strikes in the summer of 1980.

For this reason, a more ambitious formula is needed in the 1980s. It should not be limited to "economic growth in the name of social progress." Instead, we need "sociopolitical progress as a necessary condition for a balanced economic growth and as an autonomous political objective," for this is how a development strategy needs to be designed these days.

2. The political perspective is a premise of the new vision of planning. First, every practical conclusion must be drawn from the fact that planning is a political process of critical debate to accomodate divergent interests, strivings and claims of different segments of society. Planning is not a set of mathematical devices, computers and administrative techniques for manipulating economic behaviors. Second, if we desire the primacy of social objectives and genuine sociopolitical progress, planning must become more democratic. Democracy and central planning can be combined only if the central links of political and administrative authority operate openly, monitored by social representative bodies and independent, self-managed labor unions.

Labor unions and worker self-government should exert an authentic influence on five-year and annual central plans, rather than on plant plans alone. What is needed, then, is genuine representation of the self-government social factor on the central level. It could be a segment of the Sejm or a special socioeconomic council directly participating in preliminary reviews of government drafts. Under these circumstances, a plan would not result from office room bargaining, but from a civic dialog involving producers, consumers, politicians and administrators. Democratic planning is the road to socializing state authority and rendering state ownership of the means of production genuinely social.

3. The perspective of the social philosophy of historical Marxism offers opportunities for more far-reaching innovation in the planning mode. I propose to supplement the current branch and sector-regional planning by dialectic planning. Its essence is in an orientation toward research on and resolution of contradictions in the socialist system. Not only economic social, educational and cultural policies can be planned. Programs can also be developed to "intersect" those sectoral dividing lines between the fields.

The first step is a description and analysis of the system's structural contradictions. Once we compile a catalog of principal contradictions, we will notice that each of them constitutes an interlinking of political, social, economic and psycho-cultural facts. A particularly acute contradiction juxtaposes society's civic maturity and the inflexibility of the political system. To attenuate it, it is necessary to develop a program for developing the political system and refining governance, with provisions for new rules for the selection and promotion of cadres, accounting for performance of duties, institutional guarantees of democracy and compliance with the laws, civic education and individual upbringing for democracy. There should be as many separate programs of this kind as there are principle structural contradictions (e.g., the contradiction between productive forces and production relationships, a central monocentric management and local social self-government, the role of the worker as co-owner of the economy and as a paid laborer, group interests and society-wide interests in the sphere of division of goods and opportunities). The list of these contradictions is certainly much

longer. Its elaboration and social digestion is a step toward the identification of profound sources of crises and cyclical social tensions. The programs for mitigating and resolving these contradictions would have to be numerous, multivariant and with a suitably extended time frame. The development of such programs would be tasked to interdisciplinary scientific researchers, thoughtful politicians and concerned citizens.

A method for developing programs of this kind must also be a dialectic method, calling for an initial disclosure of differences of opinion. Next, choice would be made from several contradictory or divergent variants of the program. Implementation of the program should not put off a critical discussion of the methods of executive action and personal accountability. Thus, it will be possible to revise programs to take advantage of lessons derived from experience. The principle of mutuality in public criticism is a good, dialectical mode for creating institutional balances between subordinates and superiors. The dialectical style of thought, debate and action affords opportunities for planned solutions of the system's contradictions. Perhaps then the cycle "contradictions-plans-contradictions" will no longer be elemental, convulsive and disastrous in its effects. This is what we all expect from the future, although the fear of a recurrence of the errors and crises of the past has not yet faded away.

A. While designing the goals for Poland, it should not be forgotten that we form a part of a local system of alliances, a part of the European continent and a part of the world.

B. It is necessary to begin with the reform of the political system and then to reform economic management, planning and organization. The reform of political relations is a necessary precondition for a successful reform in economic planning and management.

C. Only socialization of authority can assure a transition from state ownership to genuinely social ownership.

D. Bureaucratism, pursuit of a career of a vertical type and personal security, absence of effective public scrutiny, unbridled centralism and even abuse of power are the consequences of contradictions existing in the political system.

[Illustrations] 1. Comprehensively, 2. Monitoring, 3. Specificity, 4. Consistency, 5. Critically

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FORMER POLISH OFFICIAL INTERVIEWED ON CURRENT POLITICAL-ECONOMIC CRISIS

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 10 Jan 81 p 7

[Report on interview of Adam Zwass by An Salomonson: "Only East and West Together Can Get Polish Economy Back in Shape"; date of interview not given.]

[Text] "There is only one way to get bankrupt Poland back in shape: a joint reform plan of East and West. Poland has gigantic debts in the West but is primarily dependent on the Eastern bloc for its export. Therefore a joint concept is needed if the assistance is to be effective. If it succeeds, and if there are signs that the Soviets are receptive to such a plan, it means not only the salvation of the Poles, but also the salvation of detente in Europe."

Adam Zwass smiles shyly. A heavy accent betrays his origin. We are sitting in his large, austerely furnished office on the Vienna ring. Outside a snowstorm of Eastern European dimensions is raging. The Pole Zwass will probably never see Eastern Europe again. In the West he is a displaced person, in spite of his international renown.

"If a reform plan is to succeed, the mistakes which have led to the current failure will have to be avoided. Those mistakes were too excessive investments and the retaining of the strictly centralist system. Never and nowhere was the investment figure as high as in Poland in the years 1970-1975. It grew by 18.4 percent annually. The income of the population was doubled in that period.

"That had to be financed through credits and those had to be paid off through new credits. In 1979 the real capital transfer of the borrowed credits amounted to only 15 percent. At the end of 1980 Poland was in the red with the West for 23.5 billion dollars. An unbearable situation.

"Moreover the wrong projects were chosen. The authorities were under great pressure from the large industrial bigwigs who wanted to build up their own imperium and were able to impose their demands. I call that pyramid building. An example of that is the new blast furnace in Katowice. In 1971 it was decided to expand the production to 9 million tons of raw steel. An insane decision, a matter of prestige. The budget first was 25 billion zloty, later 90 billion. Ulitmately it cost 120 billion."

Pollution

"The result is catastrophic. The losses are gigantic, not even considering the ecological effects. Pollution was already bad in Katowice. Now the air is thick with soot, the river no longer has a liquid consistency. The new blast furnace was pure suicide.

"The new railroad of 600 kilometers in the wide gauge of the Soviet Union is also such an error. With that line, larger quantities of iron ore and oil could be transported from the Soviet Union. Meanwhile the Soviets have made it known that Poland will get no more raw materials in the nineties than in the eighties. For that, the old [railroad] was just adequate. Thus everything was in vain, but the line cost tens of billions of zloty!"

According to Zwass there had indeed been warnings. There are more than enough experts in Poland, also in party circles. "There is an organization of prominent economists, sociologists, financial experts, etc. called 'Experience and the Future.' This group presented a memorandum to Gierek and the government in 1979. It comprised a merciless analysis of the catastrophic situation with a summation of the errors committed. Everyone knew that the voice of these experts carried great weight. However, the government acted as if it didn't mean anything and as if the group had to be seen as the opposition.

"Furthermore, misshapen propaganda of success was conducted. Even at the eighth party day in February 1980, when the fatal situation was already overly clear, Gierek said that the strategy of better satisfying the needs of the population had booked important successes. The same Gierek was washed away as useless by the wave of reform less than half a year later. Moczar, the chairman of the supreme chamber of control, recently admitted that erroneous figures have been published on purpose. In the figures for bituminous coal, for example, 20 percent stone was included. Truly, Potemkin villages were built in Poland."

Polish Soul

The small, white-haired Pole considers the bad system to be the main cause. "The system is unstable. It was all right for just after the war, for an extensive development. Now, with the energy crisis and a more expensive labor force as additional burdens, it is no longer tenable.

"Moreover, the party never succeeded in winning the soul of the Polish population. The people are becoming more mature, and that is true for all the satellite countries. The workers are not only better qualified, but also more self-assured. They no longer let themselves be told that they have to identify with the workers' state. Moreover, a workers' state where 20 percent of the population has to live below the minimum existence, as in Poland, is no longer taken seriously."

However, Zwass does not believe in a military intervention by the Red Army, nor does he think that reform will be cut off cold. He knows the Soviets. He knows the way of thinking in the Kremlin. For 5 years he himself was a factor in the power structure in Moscow.

"An intervention is against the Soviet reason of state. No theoretical ideological justification can be found for it. Poland would become ungovernable. The 317,000 Polish soldiers would become a permanent risk factor. The concept of the security belt around the Soviet Union would be broken by it. There is only one way out for Moscow: the Polish population must be motivated. That is only possible if it gets the guarantee of being able to retain the new democratic freedoms. I definitely do not exclude the possibility that in the highest circles in the Kremlin there is a group of people who see the necessity of this. And they don't necessarily have to be the liberal-thinking leaders. They are the realists among them."

Next Zwass wants to broach the subject of his plan for Poland's future. He is convinced that the Soviets are very interested in normalizing the situation in Poland, while respecting the political desire of the Polish population. He sees Moscow's promises of 1.1 billion dollars in aid and another 150 million dollars from the DDR as a signal.

"Without coordination between East and West, any assistance is a transit station to the next bankruptcy. The Poles themselves must work out a reform plan. For that matter, they are already doing that. An international commission made up of financial and economic experts from both blocs must sit down together to examine those plans closely. They have to reach agreement on which investment projects are justified and which are not."

Competition

"Social calm is a first condition. Otherwise not a single government will be prepared to put any more money into Poland. Thus the plans must not amputate the reform movement, but precisely must support it. Without a far-reaching form of economic competition, reform is not realizable. The price system must be revised. Furthermore I mention seven conditions which must be met:

1. The planning may no longer be strongly centralist;

2. The population controls the party leadership;

3. Censorship only on matters of national interest;

4. The unions defend the interests of the workers without abusing the right to strike to bring the economy into even greater difficulty;

5. No propaganda of success in the mass media;

6. Appointments take place on the basis of capabilities, not of ideologic inclination;

7. The workers have the right to voice their opinions.

The East-West commission will have to supervise the execution of the plans. I prefer not to use the word "control," for Poland is, and continues to be, a

sovereign state. But through the supervision of the commission in question, the donor countries from East and West will have the certainty that their aid in the form of credits, supplies, etc. will be used optimally. No more pyramids will be built."

Zwass estimates that altogether an amount of about 12 billion dollars would be needed to get the Polish economy back in shape in the intermediate term. The aid, he thinks, does not, or not entirely, have to be supplied in the form of new credits. Postponement of paying back old credits already is a big help. Through that the Poles will get breathing space. The current credits can be paid off with export, the new credits with future export. "In an emergency such as in Poland, perhaps the new credits could be given at 2 or 3 percent. Certainly that also happens with developing countries. And think of Italy: when it was in misery, it certainly was given support also."

[Question] It seems to be a clear case of wishful thinking. In order to legalize the democratic reforms in Poland in that manner, Brezhnev would have to do the impossible. Does the post-war history perhaps justify this hope?

Zwass: "Without a fundamental solution, Poland will remain a permanent explosive factor in Europe. The Soviets can not have that as well, after Afghanistan. They don't see the West as their great enemy, but China. Therefore they need quiet in Europe. A burning border on their west flank is the last thing they want."

Detente

"But detente in Europe is also essential for Moscow. The one does not go without the other. The Soviet Union badly needs the cooperation with the West to improve its own economic situation. That situation is no rosier than in Poland. They can no longer refrain from giving the Soviet population more consumer goods. To make that possible, Siberia has to be developed. That can only be done with the help of the West, with Western credits and Western know-how. Thus detente has a high priority in the Kremlin. Believe me, I know the Soviet people. They are patient, but not forever. Self-assurance is increasing there also. They realize that very well in the Kremlin.

"There also, they learn from their mistakes. The conservative forces in Moscow are very strong, but also conservatives can be realists. They can come to the conclusion that the crushing of resistance is not effective in the long run. That it will emerge again and again, even if it takes until a new generation has grown up.

"That means that the occupying forces must be maintained there. A big financial and military burden. The West has to make the most of such considerations. It must continue to negotiate until Poland has been saved. Then detente has been saved also and relations between East and West can stabilize."

[Question] The accepting of democratic freedoms, the building in of criticism and control in the party apparatus -- doesn't that mean the end of the existing communist regime?

Zwass: "The Poles are in this situation precisely because no criticism and control were possible. The Poles do not want a system other than the communist one. They don't want to leave the Warsaw Pact. No one in the reform movement has claimed that. But the Polish population has the right to develop its communist system the way it wants to itself. Those in the Kremlin are certainly not as stupid as the Bourbons who never learned anything from history. We see it indeed with our own eyes: their troops are along the border with Poland, but not inside it."

Zwass knows what he is talking about. He personally knows many communist top leaders. When he was in prison in pre-war Poland because of illegal communist activities, he got to know Gomulka and became friends with him.

Adam Zwass gets up. He will shortly present his plans for an East-West commission with a joint reform plan for Poland to an authoritative source. Perhaps he has done it already. He wraps himself in a thick Polish fur coat. Meanwhile the snow-storm has become of Siberian dimensions. "You know," he says on departing, "we must not give up belief in the realistic forces in the Kremlin. The West must continue to negotiate until something results. That is true not only for Poland. It is true also for the arms race."

PHOTO CAPTION

Dr Adam Zwass, born in Lvov (then Poland, later the Soviet Union), was one of the most important East/West financial experts of Eastern Europe. From 1963 to 1968 he represented Poland in the COMECON central council in Moscow. When a new wave of anti-semitism swept over Poland in 1969, he broke off with communism and fled to Vienna. In the past 11 years Dr Zwass has built up an international reputation as an expert in East/West monetary problems. He occupied himself especially with the convertibility of the ruble. He published two very well reviewed professional works in the United States and the FRG. He is working on a third one. In banking circles Zwass is considered to be one of the most able advisors on Eastern Europe.

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NEW COUNTIES ESTABLISHED BY COUNCIL OF STATE

Bucharest SCINTEIA in Romanian 24 Jan 81 pp 1, 2

[Text] On 23 January 1981, there was a session of the Council of State, presided over by Comrade Nicolae Ceausescu, president of the Socialist Republic of Romania.

During the session, the Council of State discussed and approved proposals referring to some improvements of the administrative organization of the territory of the Socialist Republic of Romania.

Taking into account the development of industry in the present counties of Ilfov and Ialomita and the need to use the land of this important agricultural area of the country with maximum efficiency, as well as with a view to ensuring a better supplying of vegetables and fruits to Bucharest Municipality, the Council of State of the Socialist Republic of Romania has decided on the following:

I. The reorganization of the present Ilfov and Ialomita counties and the creation of the following counties:

1. Giurgiu County, with Giurgiu Municipality as county seat;

2. Ialomita County, with Slobozia Municipality as county seat;

3. Calarasi County, with Calarasi Municipality as county seat.

II. The establishment of the Ilfov agricultural sector, subordinate to the people's council of Bucharest Municipality.



The boundaries of Giurgiu, Ialomita and Calarasi Counties and of the Ilfov agricultural sector, as approved by the Council of State

ORIGINALITY OF THIRD ROMANIAN 'WESTERN' HAILED

Bucharest ROMANIA LITERARA in Romanian 22 Jan 81 p 17

[Article by D. I. Suchianu: "The Baby, the Oil and the Transylvanians"]

[Excerpts] As the "third Romanian Western" this film has strange obligations in regard to originality. One of them is to preserve its original originality, that is, not to lose the originality with which it came into being, an innovation by which it differs, from the very beginning, from the hundreds of Westerns made up to the present. The Western has always told about the building of the American republic. Men from all nations of the earth were numbers among its builders. Each one of these peoples put their own imprint on the great "melting pot." The Romanian film makers: scenario writers Titus Popovici (he wrote the first two series and conceived the idea for the third) and Francisc Munteanu, directors Dan Pita and Mircea Veroiu tried to find a Romanian accent for this cinematographic genre. The Romanian film makers imagined a family of three Transylvanians, all brothers thinking alike but each one different--Traian Brad, the oldest brother--authoritarian, intelligent and clever; Romulus, the youngest--a false scatterbrains, an innocent who appears to be stupid but is not. In between, there is Johnny--a Romanian who is talented in everything, serious, daring, displaying a superior elegance in everything he does. This human trio contrasts with the rest of the population, with the rest of the "melting pot," in their manner of being heroic and modest at the same time. The first two films resolved problems which other Westerns had not yet treated (for example, in "The Prophet, the Gold and the Transylvanians," the deceitfulness of the Mormon clergyman in regard to the gold found by poor workers).

In the film, Johnny becomes the sheriff's assistant and the sheriff really needs one. The sheriff is a cowardly person. Out of good-heartedness, he discretely "encourages" thieves. This is an original situation not found in other Westerns. There is another innovation. Our Transylvanians are obsessed with the thought of returning home, to Poplaca, after they get rich. The desire to return home does not leave them for a second. Johnny rejects a beautiful, rich, and intelligent girl who loves him and whom he loves because he will soon be going home to Poplaca.

The brothers' neighbor is a Hungarian who is very haughty and very rich. A former Hussar in the imperial army, he is the father of four pistol-carrying sons and several beautiful daughters. When he meets the Transylvanians, they embrace with tenderness, with brotherhood and with sentimental kinship, singing songs in both

languages. Sometimes they have theoretical discussions, one of them supporting Kossuth and the other, Iancu but this does not damage their friendship. It is very interesting to see how the fact that they speak both languages and were born in Transylvania brings about an affectionate feeling of kinship.

Also interesting, original and worthy of Western romanticism was the idea of introducing into battle a bizarre weapon: a steam locomotive, without rails, running on the ground. An iron monster knocking down everything in its way, going through walls like a tank.

The authors have kept intact the psychological originality of the three brothers, their diversity, and the new elements of their many adventures, as well as their appealing Transylvanian speech, contrasting with the English spoken by the other characters.

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BRIEFS

RABBI ROSEN IN U.S.--Rabbi Moses Rosen was in the United States in January. On this occasion, he had a press conference at the headquarters of the Joint Distribution Committee in New York. During this conference, Rosen spoke about the anti-Semitic articles which appeared in the Bucharest publication SAPTAMINA, whose chief editor is the writer Eugen Barbu. He said that he sent a letter of protest to this publication but the letter was not published. Eugen Barbu came to him extending his personal apology. The rabbi said that the Communist regime has republished the works of Eminescu which contain several poems attacking Jews, explaining that during the last century there was antipathy to the Jews in Romania and Eminescu adopted this feeling. Rosen considers Eminescu to be a great poet. He knows his works by heart and has them in his library. In regard to the Jews in Romania in 1981, he said that 50 percent of them are over 65 years of age and he acknowledged that without financial aid from abroad, the Jewish community in Romania could not survive. He said that 1,200 Jews left Romania in 1980, that about 450 requests for exit permits have been submitted and that there are only 3 rabbis in Romania. [Excerpts] [Paris BULETIN DE INFORMATIE PENTRU ROMANI IN EXIL in Romanian 16 Jan 81 p 13]

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NEW APPLICATIONS FOR VETERAN'S STATUS CAUSING CONCERN

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1563, 14 Dec 80 pp 16-17

[Article by Aleksandar Tijanic: "New Old Fighters"]

[Text] Two years ago, 33 years after the war, 118,684 inhabitants of our country applied with the help of witnesses for recognition of their participation in the NOB [National Liberation Struggle]. Presidiums of opstina committees of SUBNOR [Federation of Associations of Veterans of the National Liberation War] confirmed 64.45 percent of the applications. Almost half of all the applications accepted pertained to the period before 9 September 1943.

Delegate Ivan Lapajne, speaking in a session of the Federal Chamber of the Yugoslav Assembly last week, said:

"In the area of protection of veterans and disabled veterans we should not continue in the future to broaden these rights. We should immediately put a stop once and for all to the influx of new people enjoying that right...."

One week earlier Bojan Polak, a delegate, put a question in a session of the Committee of the Federal Chamber for Affairs of Veterans and Disabled Veterans:

"How long will it be possible to apply for and obtain recognition as a veteran of the National Liberation War?"

In that same session one of the delegates asked: Is it possible that these people who are only now seeking recognition of this status were unconscious for all those years, and only now have awakened?

What is this really all about? Though every year several thousand veterans die, their total number is not dropping, since just as many new ones emerge at the same time. Just last year and this year the total number of veterans and disabled veterans (about 1.2 million) was increased by about 35,000 fighters who proved their participation in the NOB before 9 September 1943 with the help of witnesses and who have obtained their rulings.

The answer to the question about where these new veterans are coming from 3.5 decades after the end of the war has several levels. Let us begin with economics.

In the proposed version of the next federal budget 20,604,000,000 dinars are planned for benefits to veterans and disabled veterans. This is 13.4 percent of the federal budget, or 1.5 percent of the national income. After the amount intended for the armed forces, this is the largest item in the federal budget. These funds will be spent on about 800,000 recipients of basic benefits of veterans and disabled veterans. The Federation's obligations for the pensions of 399,000 veterans and survivors of fighters killed in action and deceased veterans constitute 71 percent of total funds. Expenditures on the 279,000 disabled veterans, survivors of fighters killed in action, holders of the 1941 Partisan Commemorative Medal, fighters in the Spanish Civil War, national heroes and holders of high decorations from past wars will amount to 24 percent of the funds, and about 5 percent will go for their health care, which is provided under federal statutes for 106,000 beneficiaries. Moreover, the republics and provinces and opstinas protect under their own statutes more than 400,000 veterans, and their total appropriations amount to one-third of the funds being set aside by the Federation for that purpose. These are the data which were presented to the delegates of the Federal Assembly.

Why Have They Been Waiting

Since the end of 1966 it has no longer been possible to obtain veteran's status with the evidence of witnesses. However, about 120,000 citizens said in the 1970 census that they had participated in the NOB, but did not have written proof, and could prove their participation only with the help of witnesses. This was why in late 1976 the law was amended to open up the possibility for new recognition. The entire effort was carefully prepared, and the Executive Committee of the Presidium of the LCY Central Committee even sent a letter to the republic and provincial party organs insisting on their participation in this effort and in adherence to the criteria. The law, incidentally, provided that proceedings for recognition of veteran's status could be instituted only after a certificate was obtained from the presidium of the opstina SUBNOR committee. Finally, applications would be ruled on by old-age and disability insurance communities for ascertainment of veteran's longevity on the basis of statements from witnesses.

We have already mentioned that by the summer of 1978, when the period again expired, 118,684 applications had come in. The Presidium issued 76,550 certificates, and 42,066 applications were rejected. According to Mirko Zarkovic of the Federal Committee of SUBNOR, it was expected that most of the applications would come in from women not regularly employed, farmers and people who simply had not previously had a motive or were not informed that they could institute proceedings. Contrary to expectations, about 50 percent of the applications came in from men who were steadily employed.

The very fact that nearly one application in three was checked out indicates the relative strictness of opstina committees in the granting of certificates, though almost everyone we talked to said that those same figures indicate "an unreasonable number of applications as well." Jovica Skrbic, holder of the 1941 Partisan Commemorative Medal and secretary of the New Belgrade Opstina SUBNOR Committee, said:

"Just before the period expired, 2 years ago, I was among those sought out by a great many people to confirm their participation in the struggle. There were even some whom I frankly had to tell: not only do I not know what you did during the war, but, friend, I do not even know you. Some people obviously sensed the opportunity to collect on even the smallest patriotic gesture during the war or even thought that the fighters had become a little soft, had become a bit forgetful, and that some would not even bear a grudge against people at this point. I sincerely do not understand why a good portion of those 118,000 people waited so long to institute proceedings."

Petar Vuckovic is one of those who "waited." Two years ago he submitted an application for recognition of his participation in the NOB before 9 September 1943.

"My application is still under consideration. In 1943 I was 11 years old and I was in the Fruska Gora Detachment. My father and my brothers were also in the Partisans. To tell you the truth, earlier I didn't have the courage to seek recognition, since I didn't have written proof. Recently I came upon my name in an anthology about the war, and the author mentioned me among those present in a war meeting where I spoke as a Pioneer. I also have statements from two witnesses," Vuckovic said.

The "information" of the Federal SUBNOR Committee on approving veteran's status on the basis of statements of witnesses says among other things that a certain number of people received certificates on the basis of less strict criteria than those which had been established. There were cases when certificates were issued on the basis of work in youth and rear organizations (USAOJ [United Federation of Antifascist Youth of Yugoslavia], SKOJ [Communist Youth League of Yugoslavia], and AFZ [Antifascist Women's Front]) and in government agencies. In cooperation with veterans' organizations, the authorities of old-age and disability insurance communities at times obtained data in proceedings to the effect that the number of such applications exceeded the actual enrollment of these organizations during the National Liberation War in the particular area.

Presence and Participation

It is even stated in the report that there have been "professional" suppliers of affidavits. Examples, rare to be sure, are mentioned where certain veterans have so far signed several hundreds of affidavits. It is obvious that some of the misunderstandings derive from the fact that some of

the people applying for veteran's status make no distinction between presence and participation. Mirko Zarkovic said that during the work of issuing the certificates there was a sudden increase in the number of applications for reopening of proceedings either because of requests for reclassification of service counted once as service counted double or applications being broadened to new periods of the NOB, or continuity was being requested where there had been gaps. It is obvious that this kind of phenomenon is related to the realization that the criteria used in granting the certificates were less strict than had previously been the case, he said.

Number of Applications and Rulings (up to 31 December 1979)

	Applications Submitted	No of Certificates Issued by SUBNOR	Applications Rejected	No of Rulings Issued by Communities for Social and Old-Age Insurance	
				Favorable	Unfavorable
Bosnia-Hercegovina	30,012	20,193	9,819	15,819	702
Montenegro	7,306	5,160	2,146	3,350	89
Croatia	24,350	11,469	12,881	3,080	1,863
Macedonia	11,040	7,370	3,670	7,276	94
Slovenia	7,355	4,600	2,492	2,471	14
Serbia	21,807	14,495	7,312	6,783	307
Vojvodina	5,618	3,892	1,726	5,976	390
Kosovo	11,391	9,371	2,020	8,220	419
Total	118,879	76,550	42,066	52,975	3,878

There is no misunderstanding, the period for proving veteran's status on the basis of witnesses expired at the end of 1978, but since there is no legal limitation on the institution of reopening of proceedings, several thousand people, as soon as they obtain an unfavorable ruling, retreat only for running room and immediately reopen the case. Some cases have gone on for some 10 years. Those seeking recognition of status patiently wait for the opstina committee and its membership to change so that they thus can obtain the necessary certificate more easily.

The period for proving disability because of a wartime wound or injury still has not expired, and every year between 3,000 and 5,000 people submit applications for determination of the consequences of wounds, accompanied by the prescribed statements from witnesses.

Milan Vukasovic, chairman of the Federal Committee for Affairs of Veterans and Disabled Veterans, said in a speech in the Federal Assembly that the funds proposed for benefits of veterans and disabled veterans were adequate to preserve the social security of these categories, though in future the

funds would be indexed to personal incomes in the economy rather than to the cost of living, as had previously been the case. This year the proposed funds were 18 percent higher than in the previous year. Vukasovic said that the fact that the number of veterans was growing called for a political agreement on this matter and that social and political factors must commit themselves and take a unified position to terminate the period for recognition of the status of veteran and disabled veteran.

Bosko Novakovic, holder of the 1941 Partisan Commemorative Medal, with whom we talked about the emergence of the new veterans, said:

"Even when the question of opening up the periods was discussed before 1976, it was said that 'those who were not late in joining the revolution cannot be late in proving their status either.' It is not possible to speak about whether there are too many or too few fighters, but only about their total number. Nevertheless, the fact that their number is growing instead of dropping, which would be natural, calls for a final termination of all the periods for application in which the status of veteran or disabled veteran is proven by statements from witnesses, since a majority of the tardy cases were ruled on in the previous period."

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SENTENCES FOR BRIBE-TAKING AMONG PHYSICIANS HELD LENIENT

Belgrade NEDELJNE INFORMATIVNE NOVINE in Serbo-Croatian No 1562, 7 Dec 80 pp 20-21

[Article by Milan Milosevic: "Bribes and the Courts on Trial"]

[Text] There has long been talk that physicians are taking bribes, and often these tales grow faster in the telling than those rumors about vampires. But recently there have even been certain court trials to confirm that this unhappy phenomenon does in fact exist: a gynecologist is being tried in Osijek because he performed an unlawful abortion for a bribe, and a similar trial is under way in Vranje....

In the middle of this summer four physicians and several office employees were convicted of taking bribes in Gnjilane. The physicians were charged with "selling" sick leave certificates, referrals for treatment in health resorts, and referrals to hospitals. When the sentences were pronounced, public resentment became white hot, and even the authority of the court was in a way called into question.

Discovery of the affair was preceded by much gossiping to the effect that the Gnjilane Health Center was operating openly on a payoff system. Redzep Haliti, secretary of the opstina party conference, told NIN that this was an open secret. We came to the conclusion, he said, that we should call in Dr Zecir Sahiti and tell him that because of the stories he ought no longer to be the director of the Medical Center, nor chairman of the commission making decisions on sick leave. It so happened that Dr Sahiti was arrested the very next day after that agreement in the opstina committee headquarters. A patient gave him a bribe of 5 million dinars in marked bills.

Physicians Behind Bars

That was in October of last year--the ball began to unravel. Law enforcement agencies collected some 60 statements from people who had given bribes. Most numerous among them were Yugoslavs working abroad who according to their own statements in the inquiry had in this way obtained confirmation that they were on sick leave, they stayed home longer, and they collected compensation from the German Kranken Kasse.

Several months later the list of those arrested grew longer: several more physicians were behind lock and key, and this action resounded like a bomb through this little town. Those arrested were quite prestigious individuals--two of the indicted physicians were even forensic medical experts (Dr Atanasov and Dr Sahiti); Dr Milivoje Pesic was known as a political figure and had been decorated....

Certain Oversights

As is usually the case, the public was even then ready to render the verdict. At least in part the people in Gnjilane wanted stiff penalties for the indicted physicians because they had gambled away a reputation.

It seemed that it would all end there. "The institution of criminal proceedings," ran the judgment of a working group of the opstina committee, "was favorably received by the public, and in all social institutions full support was given to judicial authorities, who, in the judgment of that working group, completed the inquiry relatively quickly. However, in subsequent proceedings these authorities committed certain oversights."

Dr Zecir Sahiti was arrested on 5 October 1979 and held in custody until 18 January 1980--110 days. The others were arrested in late December 1979, and in mid-January they were released from custody. The working group of the opstina committee felt that the accused should have been held in custody until the trial.

"There was no justification for their release since this made it possible for them to impede the subsequent course of criminal proceedings by influencing the witnesses...." The working group states that personal acquaintance with the suspects and "influence brought to bear from outside" contributed to the decision to release them. It has no evidence and accuses the judicial personnel of not having gathered it.

The investigating judge called for the release from custody, but the prosecutor did not concur. They were released from custody by a tribunal of the district court on the grounds that the legal basis had terminated once all the proposed witnesses had been interrogated.

The tribunal was motivated by a provision of the Law on Criminal Procedure which states that in principle custody during investigation should be as brief as possible.

One judge of the district court asked to be excused because his mother had been treated in that medical center. The president of the court did not allow this.

Some 10 days ago the opstina committee issued a harsh judgment of the work of all the judicial authorities in Gnjilane. This harsh judgment may be a powerful argument in the upcoming debate on the performance of the Gnjilane

courts in the opstina or provincial assembly. If the same yardstick is used there, some judges and the president of the district court might be recalled.

The judicial authorities have been charged with lack of discipline, ineffectiveness, poor cooperation between the prosecutor's offices and the courts, and so on. Nevertheless, the pretext and principal motivation were obviously the sentences issued to the bribed physicians.

The president of the district court Muharem Ljatifi did not care to respond to the judgment of the opstina committee, and consented only to offer NIN scrutiny of what is contained in the public documents.

Indicted and Convicted

Zecir Sahiti was accused of having taken bribes on 68 occasions. He was convicted of only two cases of bribery and for carrying a firearm without a license, which had no essential connection to this problem. He was sentenced to 16 months in prison.

Few witnesses responded to the summons to the trial. Many of those who did appear in court changed their testimony. The testimony of some conflicted with medical records and other evidence. In accusing the defendants the witnesses were actually admitting that they had given a bribe, but not a single one was indicted, though the giving of bribes is also a crime. Probably the prosecutors decided not to prosecute them in order to prove the guilt of the physicians more easily, their guilt obviously being more serious.

According to criminologist Vladan Vasiljevic, it is typical of bribery that the "crime rights are obscure"; bribery is difficult to detect. According to the statistics, between 1968 and 1977 the number of convictions for this crime ranged between 26 and 78 per year!

The other indicted physicians in Gnjilane had much the same fate as Dr Sahiti: Dr Milivoje Pesic was charged with 19 criminal counts, convicted of taking 13 bribes and was sentenced to 15 months in prison (the transactions amounted to about 1,000 dinars, or 100 German marks "per case").

Trajko Atanasov was charged with 10 counts and convicted of 6, and was sentenced to 1 year in prison. Dr Tufa Sterijo was charged with four counts of bribery. They were all proven, and he was sentenced to 1 year in prison.

Murati Djulishen, a technician, was charged with having been an unlawful intermediary in bribery on six occasions and it was proven that he did this on four occasions. He was sentenced to 8 months in prison, but since he had previously been sentenced to another 8 months in prison for falsifying records, he was given a single sentence of 16 months. Srboljub Kojic,

employee of the self-managed community of interest for health, was charged with three counts, was convicted of one, and was sentenced to 5 months in prison.

It is obvious that the witnesses did not represent "firm proof" in this trial. Osman Arifi, judge of the district court, said that some spoke differently than during the inquiry, the testimony of others contradicted the medical records, some were self-contradictory, and some accused the physicians who were on trial, though it was evident from the records that they had been examined by another physician.

Perhaps because of this unreliability the court did not take into account the statements of those who did not appear at the trial. And many did not appear--only about one-fourth of those summoned actually came.

Those familiar with the operation of the court say that it is a golden rule that whenever the evidence is doubtful, the sentences are less severe. The district court in Gnjilane followed this exactly. Incidentally, of the approximately 500 persons sentenced to prison in Yugoslavia for this crime, all of 398 were sentenced to 1 year or less. When compared with the Yugoslav average, the Gnjilane sentences are not light at all.

Some Figures

One educated man in Gnjilane says that the very loss of civil rights and the donning of a convict's suit are sizable penalties for prestigious physicians.

If the court in the first instance did in fact err, it will be corrected at the higher level. Does that elementary fact also apply in this situation? Can a line be drawn here? Are there slightly fewer unpleasant associations as to the reputation and behavior of the court at present below that line?

The secretary of the opstina party conference says that detection of the bribery scandal had a great political effect which was offset toward the end. "If we are to combat those things which are wrong, we should fight together. Some comrades, however, have not displayed enough willingness, maturity and conscience."

Dissatisfaction with the light sentences, as we have said, has spread even to become a general assessment of the activity of the court. Were there dilemmas about pronouncing such a judgment? The secretary answered in the negative: "For a long time now we have not examined the role of the courts in this way, we have assumed that this was after all a specific role. Even now it is not our intention to call the independence of the courts into question. Indeed they are at present alluding to that independence, but we are demanding that it not become encapsuled in the old bureaucratic relations. We have taken note that in the debate so far they have not been altogether self-critical. They have tried to justify themselves with some figures," the secretary said.

These figures throw a somewhat different light on the work of the district court, for example. The figures show that this court has had a higher load of late because of complicated cases. On the other hand the backlog of cases over the last 5 years has been dropping steadily, and the statistics show that the Kosovo Supreme Court has not to any great extent been correcting the practice of the district court in Gnjilane. In the case of embezzlement, for example, the supreme court confirmed six of the eight sentences in the first instance and made one lighter.

The question of whether there was a basis for putting the court in the dock will be evaluated by the delegates of the provincial assembly for the district court and by the delegates of the opstina assembly for the opstina court. Political voluntarism must also be borne in mind here: the desire to straighten matters out, "to put everything on a sound footing." (In an interview with the president of the opstina and the committee secretary we were even to hear a sentence like this: we replaced certain directors in production, things improved, the time has come for the situation in jurisprudence to be straightened out a bit....) Obviously authoritative critics of court practice were counting on the wave of the public mood. The public wanted rapid and harsh sentences.

It seems that here the amount of bitterness also increased because the bribery took place in the health service, in that field which is so close to the edge that divides happiness from misfortune and life from death. It is a fact that aside from the present 350 hospital beds, this town needs nearly 700 more. In such a situation the physician inevitably is treated as though he were untouchable, and if he commits a breach of moral standards, public opinion will condemn him harshly.

One person we talked to said that a relative of his had bribed a physician to obtain social welfare and that he hadn't wanted to "betray" him. Obviously this case also indicates ferment, an erosion of standards, a heightened suspicion and a dramatic discharge when certain suspicions are borne out.

The little town of Gnjilane indicates a very tumultuous transformation even in its appearance--it is a town that is taking on the contours of a city. This is to be seen both in the way people dress and the construction that is going on. Probably the little town's ferment is also being reflected in the sphere of ethics. We should also add to the picture the important detail that in this town, which has a labor force of 9,500, there are another 3,200 people working abroad. Many of the participants in this affair were precisely those people, who used their marks to grease a palm if it would be greased in order to stay longer at home. "The German Kranken Kasse was paying."

How did the Gnjilane physicians come to have an appetite for this money? An answer would be useful to have at this time.

If scandals like this are to have a moral, they should be analyzed by cool heads. Probably the most difficult job here is to weigh the facts and the consequences.

It is paradoxical that one sees good intentions on all sides. The public wants justice and stiff penalties, the committee wants justice, effectiveness, and an image of the system's reliability, the court also wants justice, but in its own specific way....

It would be dangerous if confidence in the courts were undermined by even a millimeter more than is necessary by any campaign, whatever its justification. After all, if there is one thing that these times need, it is for people to become accustomed not to scoff at standards.

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FORMER MARIBOR AUXILIARY BISHOP DISCUSSES SELF-MANAGEMENT

Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 24 Dec 80 p 5

[Unsigned summary of interview with Dr Vekoslav Grmic, former auxiliary bishop of Maribor, on 24 December 1980 by a VJESNIK staff reporter, published in START: "Self-Management as a Topic for Dialog"]

[Text] "I think that self-management, as a necessity of socialism and as a great opportunity for preventing the individual from being 'lost' in society, from becoming 'massified,' could also be a topic for dialog between Christians and Marxists," said Dr Vekoslav Grmic, professor of dogmatics, contemporary atheism and the theology of dialog at the Ljubljana School of Theology in Maribor, and until recently suffragan bishop of Maribor and rector of the Maribor Theological Seminary. We are publishing the most interesting parts of that interview in excerpts.

Speaking about his political convictions, Dr Grmic said: "I derive the commitment to socialism and to socialist values, and therefore also to Yugoslavia's socialist system, from my own religious convictions."

In Its Own Ranks as a Starting Point

In responding to a question about whether his attitude on socialism as the social system closest to Christianity were exceptional and unusual, Dr Grmic said inter alia: "As far as convictions go, I am not alone. There is nearly an entire group with a commitment similar to mine. We publish the review ZNAMENJE [SIGN]. We have a good understanding with progressive theologians in Croatia, we have good relations with progressive theologians in the world."

Dr Grmic went on to speak about the present situation of Catholicism, which according to him, is characterized by a weakening of the spirit of the council and a slowing down of the process following the council as a consequence of the "strain between those who wish to stay with what is outdated and those who want to move forward, between the traditionalists and the progressives." In this connection and with particular consideration to the church's attitude toward the contemporary world, Dr Grmic said: "I would

say that the problems are both in the world and in the church. Religious people are still acting within the framework of the church, the institution is still very powerful, and its influence is also great. As the church goes, so go its members. Its too bad, but that is the case. The church will be all the more convincing insofar as it reforms itself. If it does not do this, neither it as a whole, nor its individual members will have either respect or persuasiveness in today's world. But if the church desires that human rights be respected in the world, then it must fully respect them in its own ranks and must respect them so consistently that no one can reproach it for having violated them itself. If the church wants freedom and democracy to prevail in the world, then they must first prevail fully in the church itself. If it wants to fight totalitarianism in the world, then it must first do away with it altogether in its own ranks."

Neither For Religion Nor Against It

In evaluating trends in our own church in more detail, Dr Grmic said: "Developments in our own church depend very much on church developments in the world. Along with certain progressive developments, in our own church certain very conservative and even very reactionary currents are also emerging more and more, especially those opposed to certain socialistically oriented trends in Christianity. Very recently certain efforts have begun to be made in our church--rather powerful ones--to return to the church the position it once had in Yugoslavia, and that implies in the schools, in upbringing, in the news media, in radio and television."

Dr Grmic went on to say in this connection: "Clericalism is no longer manifested in our country as it formerly was, since there is simply no opportunity for that. But it still exists in latent form and raises its head wherever possible. There is no question that certain tendencies of clericalism are again taking on strength in our country. They would like the church to have the importance in public life it once had and to decide on all matters it formerly decided. They don't realize that a secularized society will never allow that, since we live in a secularized state. And actually the church should be striving for our society to become truly secularized, so that it is not committed either for or against religion, but is committed to socialism. This means schools committed to socialism, upbringing committed to socialism: neither for religion nor against it."

Speaking about the postwar development of our relations between church and state, Dr Grmic said inter alia that relations have "become almost entirely normal since establishment of diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and the Vatican. It is true," Dr Grmic went on to say, "that this position is not to the liking of certain people both here at home in church circles and among factionalists, nor outside the country among the emigres. They speak about the church's lack of freedom in Yugoslavia, since they cannot imagine the church without authority and without a decisive influence on all public life. They cannot accept a secularized program on television, nor are they happy with a secularized and socialistically oriented school, nor can they reconcile themselves to the new Yugoslavia."

Religious Believers as True Socialists

In answering the question as to the basis on which good relations can be developed between the church and society, Dr Grmic said: "We will easily agree if we acknowledge our social system once and for all and if we accept the council idea of the autonomy of secular affairs. It must be clear to us that religious believers will have full equality with citizens committed to socialism who are not religious providing only that they strive for socialism and do not remain aloof. In the end the religious believer designs his own destiny. It is true that society frames its judgment of religious believers on the basis of some of the responsible religious representatives. I will not say that on the side of the nonbelievers there are not factionalists who see religious people only as an enemy and who think that socialism is built by attacking religion. Just as there are religious believers who have substituted antitheism for socialism. But these are still isolated cases, and there unquestionably will be fewer of them as religious people win greater legitimacy as true socialists. Clericalism and factionalism are indeed enemies, but they sorely need one another.

"If the leaders of the church try to forget the spirit of the council, if they make a play for power, if they do not strive to understand the signs of the times--they will distance themselves further and further from the true believers and that will make the position of religious believers in socialist society more difficult. Hints of some such tendencies have recently been felt in the church."

Speaking in conclusion about the possibility and necessity of a dialog between Christians and Marxists, Dr Grmic said inter alia: "Hope in my opinion is an essential category of Christianity, Christianity lives on hope. And it is also significant about Marxism that it is essentially oriented toward the future. Here as a Christian I find a point of similarity with the Marxists...."

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